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Criminal responsibility is almost universally thought        
to require moral responsibility.  Using the psychological theory    
of “situationism,” however, I will argue that criminal 
responsibility can survive—and therefore that defendants        
can be justly punished—without moral responsibility. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 “It’s an explanation, not an excuse.”  Most of us have 
heard or used this expression.  But few genuinely understand it.  
What, after all, is the difference between explaining and 
excusing?  If I do something wrong to you and then offer you 
the cause or reason—for example, “I was tired,” “I was angry,” 
“I was panicking,” “I was not myself,” or “I’m mentally ill”—
that cause or reason is my explanation.  (It is the correct 
explanation if I am not lying or self-deluded).  But does this 
explanation qualify as a good excuse?  The answer:  it depends. 
Suppose, for example, that Romeo is in a relationship with 
Juliet and observes her talking with another man at a bar.  
Romeo becomes jealous and angry.  When Juliet returns to the 
table, Romeo yells at her.  Later, when they return home, Romeo 
apologizes.  He says, “I’m sorry, but I’m just a very possessive 
guy.  I was also pretty drunk.”  Is this explanation a good 
excuse? 
The answer to this question is largely up to Juliet.  What 
constitutes a good excuse is almost entirely determined by the 
norms governing their relationship.  If Juliet and Romeo 
normally yell at each other in public, then Romeo’s explanation 
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should qualify as a good enough excuse.  If, however, Romeo’s 
behavior was unusual for them, then Romeo’s excuse is more 
questionable.  Juliet will have to consider not only the sincerity 
and plausibility of Romeo’s explanation but also the influence 
that her acceptance or rejection will have on Romeo’s future 
behavior and on their relationship itself. 
Now transfer this situation to the criminal law.  Of course, 
yelling at one’s girlfriend is wrong, but it is not a crime.  So 
instead of yelling at Juliet, let’s assume that Romeo hit her.  
That is a battery.1  And if Romeo is arrested, Romeo’s attorney 
will certainly advise him that the explanation he gave to Juliet 
for yelling at her—again, being drunk and jealous—should not 
work with any judge or jury.2  The criminal law assumes that the 
explanation in this situation does not amount to a good excuse.  
This assumption itself rests on two deeper assumptions.  The 
first assumption is that Romeo’s reasons for violating the law 
are not very good; they do not qualify as reasons that society 
accepts.  The second assumption is that Romeo is responsible 
for his violent behavior.  Putting both of these assumptions 
together, we conclude that Romeo is blameworthy and therefore 
punishable for hitting Juliet. 
In this article, I focus on the second assumption.  I will 
argue that a person may deserve criminal punishment even in 
certain situations where she is not necessarily responsible for her 
criminal act.  What these situations share in common are two 
things:  (a) the psychological factors that motivate the 
individual’s behavior are environmentally determined; and (b) 
her crime is serious, making her less eligible for sympathy. 
I will arrive at this conclusion in four steps.  In Part II, I 
will offer the first two of these steps.  First, I will argue that our 
virtually sacred assumption that responsibility is necessary for 
just blame and punishment is not self-evident and is actually 
rather difficult to explain and justify.  Second, I will offer an 
explanation and justification that appeals to our moral 
psychology:  we subscribe to this assumption (that responsibility 
is necessary for just blame and punishment) ultimately because 
 
1.  6 AM. JUR. 2D Assault and Battery § 2 (2015) (defining battery as “a wrongful or 
offensive physical contact with another through the intentional contact by the perpetrator 
and without the victim’s consent”). 
2.  Id. § 45 (noting that intoxication is not a defense to battery). 
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we sympathize with agents who lack responsibility for their 
actions. 
Third, in Part IV, I aim to show that even if responsibility is 
not conceptually—only “emotionally”—necessary for just 
blame and punishment, the traditionally recognized criminal 
excuses (automatism, duress, entrapment, hypnosis, infancy, 
insanity, involuntary intoxication, mistake of fact, and mistake 
of law) are not at risk because, contrary to popular wisdom, they 
do not really rely on this assumption (that responsibility is 
necessary for just blame and punishment) to begin with.  
Instead, they stand less for the metaphysical proposition that we 
should refrain from blaming and punishing the non-responsible 
and more for the normative/ethical proposition that we should 
refrain from blaming and punishing those whom we cannot 
reasonably expect to have acted better.  I will further argue that 
the latter proposition does not reduce to the former. 
Fourth, once I have defended my account of the excuses, I 
will question in Parts V and VI the increasingly popular notion 
that we should add certain conditions or circumstances to the list 
of recognized excuses.  I will focus on one in particular—the 
psychological theory of “situationism”3—and will argue that, 
despite its initial plausibility, it should be kept off the list.  
 
3.  See Lee Ross & Donna Shestowsky, Two Social Psychologists' Reflections on 
Situationism and the Criminal Justice System, in IDEOLOGY, PSYCHOLOGY, AND LAW 612, 
613 (Jon Hanson ed., 2012); PHILIP ZIMBARDO, THE LUCIFER EFFECT: UNDERSTANDING 
HOW GOOD PEOPLE TURN EVIL vii (2008); David J. Arkush, Situating Emotion: A Critical 
Realist View of Emotion and Nonconscious Cognitive Processes for Law and Legal Theory, 
2008 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1275, 1277 n.1 (2008); Adam Benforado et al., Broken Scales: 
Obesity and Justice in America, 53 EMORY L.J. 1645, 1657-58 (2004); Kenneth B. Davis, 
Jr., Structural Bias, Special Litigation Committees, and the Vagaries of Director 
Independence, 90 IOWA L. REV. 1305, 1329 (2005); Dain C. Donelson & Robert A. 
Prentice, Scienter Pleading and Rule 10b-5: Empirical Analysis and Behavioral 
Implications, 63 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 441, 500 (2012); Caroline Forell, McTorts: The 
Social and Legal Impact of McDonald's Role in Tort Suits, 24 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 
105, 111-12 (2011); Jon Hanson & David Yosifon, The Situational Character: A Critical 
Realist Perspective on the Human Animal, 93 GEO. L.J. 1, 7-8, 170-79 (2004); Michael A. 
McCann, Social Psychology, Calamities, and Sports Law, 42 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 585, 
630-31 (2006); Roger C. Park, Grand Perspectives on Evidence Law, 87 VA. L. REV. 2055, 
2068 (2001); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The Psychological Foundations of Behavioral Law and 
Economics, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 1675, 1690 (2011); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The Limits of 
Social Norms, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1537, 1566 (2000) [hereinafter Rachlinski, Limits]; 
L. Song Richardson, Arrest Efficiency and the Fourth Amendment, 95 MINN. L. REV. 2035, 
2055 n.105 (2011); Amy L. Wax, Musical Chairs and Tall Buildings: Teaching Poverty 
Law in the 21st Century, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1363, 1386-87 (2007); Andrew K. 
Woods, A Behavioral Approach to Human Rights, 51 HARV. INT'L L.J. 51, 56-57 (2010). 
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While situationism arguably does negate moral responsibility, it 
does not negate criminal responsibility.  For a given criminal act 
that is “situationally” motivated, a person might be criminally 
responsible (and therefore criminally punishable) but not 
morally responsible.  From this point, my ultimate thesis 
follows:  just criminal punishment does not require moral 
responsibility. 
Of course, this thesis is controversial.  Criminal 
responsibility and therefore just criminal punishment are almost 
universally thought to require moral responsibility.4  But in a 
previous article, I used personality psychology to drive a wedge 
between the two.5  In this article, I will use the opposite end of 
the psychological spectrum—social psychology—to drive the 
same important wedge. 
II.  RESPONSIBILITY 
In this Part, I will describe and attempt to solve a puzzle.  
On the one hand, responsibility is poorly understood.  On the 
other hand, this poorly understood entity is considered to be 
supremely important in criminal law.6  This is an odd situation.  
How can such a mysterious entity play such a significant role?  I 
 
4.  See Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U.S. 442, 466 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(“Fundamental fairness prohibits the punishment of innocent people.”); Protocol 
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of 
Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), art. 75, 4(b), June 8, 1977, 1125 
U.N.T.S. 3 (“[N]o one shall be convicted of an offence except on the basis of individual 
penal responsibility . . . .”); Richard J. Bonnie, Excusing and Punishing in Criminal 
Adjudication: A Reality Check, 5 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 10-11 (1995) (“[W]e 
remind ourselves of the general postulates of free choice and personal responsibility which 
provide the moral foundation for the social practice of criminal punishment.”); Anne M. 
Coughlin, Excusing Women, 82 CAL. L. REV. 1, 18 (1994) (“[T]he theory of personal 
responsibility for conduct . . . is the foundation for punishment . . . .”); Paul H. Robinson, 
Are We Responsible for Who We Are? The Challenge for Criminal Law Theory in the 
Defenses of Coercive Indoctrination and “Rotten Social Background,” 2 ALA. C.R. & C.L. 
L. REV. 53, 75-76 (2011) (“There is an enormous lay intuitive commitment to the notion 
that people normally operate with free will, that people are generally responsible for who 
they are.  It is this foundation that supports the essentially universal human intuition that 
serious wrongdoing deserves punishment.”) (footnote omitted); Richard Singer & Douglas 
Husak, Of Innocence and Innocents: The Supreme Court and Mens Rea Since Herbert 
Packer, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 859, 860 (1999) (“Only the blameworthy (guilty), and not 
the blameless (innocent), should be punished.”). 
5.  Ken Levy, Dangerous Psychopaths: Criminally Responsible But Not Morally 
Responsible, Subject to Criminal Punishment And to Preventive Detention, 48 SAN DIEGO 
L. REV. 1299, 1362-67 (2011). 
6.  See supra note 4 and accompanying text.  
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will resolve this tension by arguing that responsibility should be 
regarded as much a psychological concept as a metaphysical 
concept.  I will further distinguish in Part III between moral 
responsibility and criminal responsibility and argue in Part VI 
that only the latter, not the former, should be regarded as 
fundamental to the criminal justice system. 
A. Two Kinds of Blameless Wrongdoing 
It is a foundational axiom of criminal law—call it the 
“Responsibility Axiom”—that criminal punishment requires or 
presupposes responsibility.7  We believe that a person should not 
be blamed and punished unless she not merely performed a 
wrongful act but also was responsible—blameworthy—for this 
performance.  Our adherence to the Responsibility Axiom 
explains why all but the very few strict liability crimes (such as 
statutory rape) require a mens rea element (purpose, knowledge, 
recklessness, or criminal negligence) to be satisfied.8  Whether 
or not a wrongdoer is blameworthy will largely depend on 
whether or not she had the mens rea, a mental state that indicates 
a willingness to inflict, or risk inflicting, unjustifiable harm upon 
another.9 
It follows from the Responsibility Axiom that we cannot 
justly punish blameless wrongdoing—that is, wrongdoing 
without the required mens rea.  There are two different kinds of 
blameless wrongdoing.10  The first kind is unintentional harm—
 
7.  See id. 
8.  See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (2014) (“[A] person is not guilty of an offense 
unless he acted purposely, knowingly, recklessly or negligently, as the law may require, 
with respect to each material element of the offense.”); SANFORD H. KADISH ET AL., 
CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES: CASES AND MATERIALS 242 (9th ed. 2012) (“The 
vicious will [is] the mens rea; essentially it refers to the blameworthiness entailed in 
choosing to commit a criminal wrong.”); 21 AM. JUR. 2D Criminal Law § 117 (2015) 
(“Mens rea is generally an essential element of any criminal offense . . . .”).  But see id. § 
132 (“Strict liability allows for criminal liability absent the element of mens rea . . . .”). 
9.  See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02. 
10.  Strict liability crimes such as statutory rape and selling alcohol to minors are not 
good examples of blameless wrongdoing.  They are blameworthy and therefore punishable 
to the extent that the offenders voluntarily assumed the risk of breaking the law.  This point 
explains why involuntariness is a perfectly acceptable defense for strict liability crimes.  
See Laurie L. Levenson, Good Faith Defenses: Reshaping Strict Liability Crimes, 78 
CORNELL L. REV. 401, 431 (1993) (“While a strict liability crime does not require a 
culpable mental state, it does require a voluntary criminal act. . . .  The existence of an 
actus reus requirement allows a defendant charged with a strict liability offense to invoke 
the defense that he acted involuntarily.  If a defendant acts involuntarily, for instance, by 
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that is, actus reus without the mens rea.  A good example is a 
purely innocent accident such as driving carefully but still 
hitting a child who has darted in front of the car. 
The second kind of blameless wrongdoing is intentional 
wrongdoing that is excused.11  Consider two examples.  The first 
example is a paranoid schizophrenic who intentionally kills her 
neighbor from an honest but unjustifiable fear that the latter is 
“out to get” her.  She committed intentional wrongdoing (killing 
her neighbor), but she is blameless to the extent that she is 
insane—that is, to the extent that she did not know or have 
“substantial capacity . . . to appreciate” the moral and/or legal 
status of her act.12  The second example is a person—call her 
“Peggy”—who playfully fires what she honestly and reasonably, 
but mistakenly, believes to be an unloaded gun at her friend.  
Peggy intentionally fired the gun, but she is blameless to the 
extent that her belief that it was unloaded was honest and 
reasonable.13 
B. The Blameless Wrongdoer Argument 
Why does criminal punishment require blameworthiness in 
the first place?  Why can’t we seek to punish blameless 
wrongdoers, especially blameless criminal wrongdoers—that is, 
persons who blamelessly cause criminal harm?  
Consequentialists will argue that we cannot punish blameless 
wrongdoers because it does no good.  Indeed, it just does 
“bad.”14  It does not help to promote specific deterrence, general 
deterrence, or rehabilitation.15 
 
reflex or in an automatic state, he cannot commit a strict liability crime regardless of his 
mental state.”) (footnote omitted).   
11.  See 1 PAUL H. ROBINSON ET AL., Criminal Law Defenses § 25 (2015).  
12.  MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01(1) (2014); see generally Walter Sinnott-Armstrong 
& Ken Levy, Insanity Defenses, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF PHILOSOPHY OF CRIMINAL 
LAW 299 (John Deigh & David Dolinko eds., 2011) (discussing the insanity defense).  I 
will briefly discuss the insanity defense further in Part VII. 
13.  See ROBINSON ET AL., supra note 11, § 181 (describing certain exculpatory 
mistakes). 
14.  Russell L. Christopher, Deterring Retributivism: The Injustice of “Just” 
Punishment, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 843, 922 (2002) (“Consequentialist theories hold that 
punishment of an innocent lowers societal welfare to a greater extent than punishment of a 
guilty person.”). 
15.  See LOUIS KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE 348 
(2002) (“[C]onsequentialist approaches would most likely oppose punishment of the 
innocent person . . . [because] such punishment would fail in its purpose and have serious 
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In response to this point, however, punishing blameless 
wrongdoers can do some good.  It can help to facilitate 
incapacitation and therefore protection of society.16  For 
example, locking up Peggy, the woman who blamelessly shot 
her friend, will certainly prevent her from playfully firing her 
gun again. 
Consequentialists will object to this response on two 
grounds.  First, they will say that we do not necessarily need to 
protect society from Peggy (and other Peggy-like individuals).17  
She most likely learned her lesson and will not play with a gun 
again.18  Second, consequentialists will say that even if we did 
need to protect society from Peggy, we could have facilitated 
incapacitation anyway—through civil commitment or simply 
confiscating her gun—without all of the stigma and disapproval 
that punishment carries.19 
Still, it is not clear that consequentialists are entitled to this 
second point.  First, this complaint about inappropriate stigma 
and disapproval itself presupposes that the blameless wrongdoer 
does not deserve punishment, precisely the point that is in 
question and that consequentialists especially are not entitled to, 
 
adverse consequences if word got out, which is likely.”); Guyora Binder & Nicholas J. 
Smith, Framed: Utilitarianism and Punishment of the Innocent, 32 RUTGERS L.J. 115, 212 
(2000) (“Utilitarian penology could not recommend a government policy of publicly and 
deliberately punishing innocent people because this would impose needless suffering, 
create perverse incentives, and destroy public security.”); Ehud Guttel & Doron Teichman, 
Criminal Sanctions in the Defense of the Innocent, 110 MICH. L. REV. 597, 609 (2012) 
(“From a consequentialist approach, penalizing the innocent undercuts the goal of 
minimizing the social costs of crime.  If defendants are punished even when they observe 
the law, incentives to comply with legal rules are diluted and deterrence goals are 
undermined.”) (footnote omitted); John Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules, 64 PHIL. REV. 3, 
11-12 (1955) (“[O]ne sees that the hazards [of deliberately punishing the innocent] are very 
great. . . .  If one pictures how such an institution would actually work, and the enormous 
risks involved in it, it seems clear that it would serve no useful purpose.  A utilitarian 
justification for this institution is most unlikely.”). 
16.  See MICHAEL MOORE, PLACING BLAME: A GENERAL THEORY OF THE 
CRIMINAL LAW 93 n.19, 94-97 (1997); J.J.C. SMART, An Outline of a System of Utilitarian 
Ethics, in UTILITARIANISM: FOR AND AGAINST 3, 69-72 (1973); WILFRID J. WALUCHOW, 
THE DIMENSIONS OF ETHICS: AN INTRODUCTION TO ETHICAL THEORY 166-68 (2003); 
Binder & Smith, supra note 15, at 118; Christopher, supra note 14, at 870-80, 922-23; Jean 
Hampton, The Moral Education Theory of Punishment, 13 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 208, 214 
(1984); Laura Peterson, Note, Collective Sanctions: Learning from the NFL’s Justifiable 
Use of Group Punishment, 14 TEX. REV. ENT. & SPORTS L. 165, 169-70, 172 (2013); 
Rawls, supra note 15, at 4-5; Robinson, supra note 4, at 61-62. 
17.  See MOORE, supra note 16, at 99. 
18.  See id. 
19.  See id. 
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given that they either reject retributivism—the theory that the 
primary purpose of criminal punishment is not to minimize 
future crimes but rather to give offenders their just deserts—or 
subordinate retributivism to consequentialism.20  Second, it is 
not as obvious as consequentialists tend to assume that 
punishing blameless wrongdoers would not further promote two 
of the main consequentialist goals of punishment—general 
deterrence and specific deterrence.  This point cannot simply be 
assumed; instead, it ultimately relies on empirical evidence.21 
Another reason some might offer why we cannot punish the 
blameless is semantic:  just punishment is predicated on just 
blame, and we cannot justly blame the blameless without self-
contradiction.  Still, this explanation is tautological and therefore 
not very helpful.  It explains only why it might be somewhat 
illogical, not morally wrong, to punish the blameless.  And it is 
the moral connection between blame, punishment, and 
responsibility that we are trying to explain here.  To make this 
point clearer, I reformulate the questions at the beginning of this 
section as follows:  why can’t we blame and punish people who 
commit criminal wrongdoing if we deem them to be non-
responsible for their wrongdoing? 
This is not an easy question, certainly not as easy as it first 
seems.  One may argue that the Responsibility Axiom—which, 
again, says that criminal punishment requires responsibility—is 
self-evident.  But this position is weak, if only because we may 
well imagine individuals and cultures that do not share this 
belief, cultures that do not believe in individual responsibility 
itself or in responsibility as a necessary condition of just 
criminal punishment.22  Of course, we can simply assert that 
 
20.  See Ken Levy, Why Retributivism Needs Consequentialism: The Rightful Place 
of Revenge in the Criminal Justice System, 66 RUTGERS L. REV. 629, 633-35 (2014) 
(explaining the differences among the three main theories of criminal punishment:  
retributivism, consequentialism, and expressivism); see also Rawls, supra note 15, at 4 
(“What we may call the retributive view is that punishment is justified on the grounds that 
wrongdoing merits punishment.”).  
21.  See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
22.  See HAROLD J. BERMAN, JUSTICE IN THE U.S.S.R.: AN INTERPRETATION OF 
SOVIET LAW 297 (rev. ed. 1963) (discussing “the strong Russian cultural tradition of 
collective responsibility for individual misconduct”); HENRY SUMNER MAINE, ANCIENT 
LAW: ITS CONNECTION WITH THE EARLY HISTORY OF SOCIETY, AND ITS RELATION TO 
MODERN IDEAS 126-27 (1861) (stating that in ancient law, a family was responsible for the 
actions of its members; an individual’s moral status depended on the group of which he 
was a member); SYBILLE VAN DER SPRENKEL, LEGAL INSTITUTIONS IN MANCHU CHINA: 
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they are wrong and we are right.  But if we really are right, then 
we should be able to justify this belief.  So it is preferable to 
defend the Responsibility Axiom with an argument.  One such 
argument goes like this: 
(1) Just as it would be dramatically unjust, indeed the very 
definition of injustice, to knowingly punish an innocent 
person—that is, a person whom we know did not commit 
the crime in question—so too it would be dramatically 
unjust to knowingly punish a blameless wrongdoer.23  
There might be good consequentialist reasons for 
knowingly punishing an innocent person, a point that is 
often used against consequentialism.24  But there is no good 
retributive—that is, desert-based—reason for knowingly 
punishing an innocent person.  Knowingly punishing an 
innocent person is the supreme antithesis of retributive 
justice. 
(2) The reason that an innocent person should not be 
punished is because she is blameless.  Her moral immunity 
from punishment is in virtue of her blamelessness. 
(3) Therefore all blameless people, even if wrongdoers, do 
not deserve punishment any more than the innocent person. 
(4) Ex hypothesi, the blameless wrongdoer is blameless. 
(5) Therefore the blameless wrongdoer is just as 
undeserving of punishment as the innocent person. 
Call this the “Blameless Wrongdoer Argument.” 
Unfortunately, the Blameless Wrongdoer Argument is not 
successful.  Unlike the innocent person, the blameless 
wrongdoer committed a crime (let’s not forget!).  This is a very 
significant difference between the two, one that arguably makes 
all the difference.  Even if the wrongdoer is blameless, she 
 
A SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS 47 (1962) (“The edict of 1708 . . . stressed the principle of 
group responsibility for misdeeds of members, an idea with deep roots in China.”); Morris 
R. Cohen, The Basis of Contract, 46 HARV. L. REV. 553, 556 (1933) (“The older view held 
the family, tribe, or nation responsible for the acts of any one individual . . . .”); David C. 
Williams & Susan H. Williams, Volitionalism and Religious Liberty, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 
769, 780 (1991) (“[C]hoice may be a social act, as when a group must reach a decision 
together.  Or, choice may also be the act of only one of the personalities within a single 
human being, as in the common experience of a battle of ‘competing identities.’  If 
American cultures fully recognized either of these alternatives, then an emphasis on choice 
would not necessarily lead to the individualistic version of responsibility which currently 
dominates the law.”) (footnote omitted). 
23.  See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
24.  See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
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should still be punished for her wrongdoing; the fact that she 
caused criminal harm matters more than the fact that she is 
blameless for this harm.  She did it and she needs to pay!  That 
is all there is to the matter.25 
Yes, this attitude seems unfair.  But it is arguably more 
unfair to the victim not to punish the person who victimized her.  
So the Blameless Wrongdoer Argument and its assumed 
equivalence between the innocent person and the blameless 
wrongdoer breaks down, in which case a different argument 
must be provided for excusing blameless wrongdoers from 
punishment.  If no such argument can be provided, then 
excusing blameless wrongdoers is unjustified. 
C. A Working Conception of Responsibility 
Once we distinguish between the blameless wrongdoer and 
the innocent person (non-wrongdoer), it remains to be explained 
why we should refrain from blaming and punishing the 
former—the person who (we know) committed a crime.  We 
think that the blameless wrongdoer is blameless not because she 
did not commit the crime—she did—but because another 
condition necessary for justly blaming her is absent.  This 
condition, we have already seen, is responsibility.  So we return 
to the question driving this Part:  why is responsibility thought 
to be necessary for just blame and punishment? 
Indeed, it should strike us as rather odd that responsibility 
is regarded as just as important for blame and punishment as 
 
25.  See Levy, supra note 20, at 651-52 (“[M]any, if not most, human beings—
instinctively wish to return harm for (unjustified and unexcused) harm.  They—we—feel 
the urge to hurt another person who has, we feel, unjustifiably and inexcusably hurt us. . . .  
We feel tremendous satisfaction in putting the perpetrator in the same position that she put 
us (the victim).  This turning of the crime against the perpetrator helps to restore our sense 
of emotional equilibrium.”) (footnote omitted); id. at 656-57 (“[O]ur desire to achieve 
retributive justice—just deserts—is not sui generis but is itself motivated by a deeper 
desire, the desire for revenge.  We believe that it is (a) just to punish criminals in 
proportion to the moral severity of their crimes and (b) unjust not to punish them or to 
under-punish them not because (a) and (b) are self-evident principles or because dispensing 
just deserts is obviously a good end in itself but because we are the kind of beings who 
desire (proportional) revenge in response to culpable causation of harm.”) (footnote 
omitted); id. at 666 (“Whether or not we admit it, most of us embrace revenge in our 
everyday lives. . . . [W]e spend much of our everyday lives enjoying both fictional and 
non-fictional accounts of karma, payback, the tables being turned, settling scores, getting 
even, and unpleasant people getting theirs across widely different contexts.”) (footnotes 
omitted). 
2015] DOES SITUATIONISM EXCUSE? 785	
wrongdoing itself.  It is odd because, while we have little 
difficulty determining what wrongdoing is—criminal 
wrongdoing is a voluntary commission of an act that the State 
has designated as a crime26—we have great difficulty 
determining what responsibility is.  Philosophers have been 
debating this issue for centuries—especially the twentieth and 
early twenty-first—and still have not arrived at anything near a 
consensus.  On the contrary, there are many different theories of 
responsibility out there.  And while there is some overlap among 
them, they diverge radically from one another.27  So how can we 
even know that this mysterious entity, responsibility, is 
necessary for just blame and punishment if we still do not 
know—or at least cannot agree—on what it even is? 
The pragmatic answer to this conundrum is that we can 
agree on what responsibility essentially is, what it is at the core, 
which is all that matters for the criminal justice system.  
 
26.  MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01(1) (2014) (“A person is not guilty of an offense 
unless his liability is based on conduct that includes a voluntary act or the omission to 
perform an act of which he is physically capable.”). 
27.  The following philosophers all offer differing accounts of responsibility:  JOSEPH 
KEIM CAMPBELL, FREE WILL (2011); GREGG. D. CARUSO, FREE WILL AND 
CONSCIOUSNESS: A DETERMINIST ACCOUNT OF THE ILLUSION OF FREE WILL (2012); 
RANDOLPH CLARKE, LIBERTARIAN ACCOUNTS OF FREE WILL (2003); DANIEL DENNETT, 
FREEDOM EVOLVES (2003) [hereinafter DENNETT, FREEDOM EVOLVES]; DANIEL 
DENNETT, ELBOW ROOM: THE VARIETIES OF FREE WILL WORTH WANTING (1984) 
[hereinafter DENNETT, ELBOW ROOM]; RICHARD DOUBLE, THE NON-REALITY OF FREE 
WILL (1991); JOHN MARTIN FISCHER, THE METAPHYSICS OF FREE WILL (1994); JOHN 
MARTIN FISCHER & MARK RAVIZZA, S.J., RESPONSIBILITY AND CONTROL: A THEORY OF 
MORAL RESPONSIBILITY (1998); CARL GINET, ON ACTION (1990); ISHTIYAQUE HAJI, 
MORAL APPRAISABILITY (1998); SAM HARRIS, FREE WILL (2012); ROBERT KANE, THE 
SIGNIFICANCE OF FREE WILL (1996); NEIL LEVY, CONSCIOUSNESS AND MORAL 
RESPONSIBILITY (2014); NEIL LEVY, HARD LUCK: HOW LUCK UNDERMINES FREE WILL 
AND MORAL RESPONSIBILITY (2011); MICHAEL MCKENNA, CONVERSATION AND 
RESPONSIBILITY (2012); ALFRED R. MELE, FREE WILL AND LUCK (2006); DANA KAY 
NELKIN, MAKING SENSE OF FREEDOM AND RESPONSIBILITY (2011); TIMOTHY 
O’CONNOR, PERSONS AND CAUSES: THE METAPHYSICS OF FREE WILL (2000); DERK 
PEREBOOM, LIVING WITHOUT FREE WILL (2001); SAUL SMILANSKY, FREE WILL AND 
ILLUSION (2000); PETER VAN INWAGEN, AN ESSAY ON FREE WILL (1983); R. JAY 
WALLACE, RESPONSIBILITY AND THE MORAL SENTIMENTS (1994); BRUCE N. WALLER, 
AGAINST MORAL RESPONSIBILITY (2011) [hereinafter WALLER, AGAINST]; BRUCE N. 
WALLER, FREEDOM WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY (1990); SUSAN WOLF, FREEDOM WITH 
REASON (1990); Harry Frankfurt, Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person, 68 J. 
PHIL. 5 (1971); Harry Frankfurt, Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility, 66 J. 
PHIL. 828 (1969) [hereinafter Frankfurt, Alternate Possibilities]; David Hunt, Moral 
Responsibility and Unavoidable Action, 97 PHIL. STUD. 195 (2000); Stephen Morse, 
Culpability and Control, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1587 (1994) [hereinafter Morse, Culpability 
and Control]. 
786 ARKANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol.  68:775	
Responsibility is essentially “the set of conditions an agent bears 
that make it genuinely fair to blame or praise and possibly 
punish or reward that agent for a given act.”28  These conditions 
include not only the commission of a given act (or omission), 
but also a minimal level of rational, cognitive, and volitional 
capacities at the time that the agent commits this act (or 
omission).  These capacities include at least a threshold 
awareness of her environment, threshold understanding of the 
moral or legal reasons for or against her committing this act (or 
omission), and the ability to effectively translate these reasons 
into action.29 
What philosophers then debate is what other conditions, if 
any, are required for responsibility.  They debate, for example, 
whether indeterminism is necessary.30  Some say it is,31 others 
say it is not,32 and still others say that it is necessary for some 
 
28.  Levy, supra note 5, at 1328.  
29.  See Stephen D. Hart, Psychopathy, Culpability, and Commitment, in MENTAL 
DISORDER AND CRIMINAL LAW: RESPONSIBILITY, PUNISHMENT AND COMPETENCE 159, 
164 (Robert F. Schopp et al. eds., 2009) (“Cognitive functions are construed in broad terms 
in the law as those related to the capacity for rational thought, including the abilities to 
perceive the outside world accurately, to weigh or consider information, and to appreciate 
meaning or consequences of interpersonal behavior . . . .”); Stephen J. Morse, Excusing 
and the New Excuse Defenses: A Legal and Conceptual Review, 23 CRIME & JUST. 329, 
392 (1998) (“[T]he general capacity for rationality or normative competence is . . . a 
congeries of perceptual, cognitive, and affective abilities. . . .  [M]ost generally it includes 
the ability, in Susan Wolf’s words, ‘to be sensitive and responsive to relevant changes in 
one’s situation and environment—that is, to be flexible’ . . . It is the ability to perceive 
accurately, to get the facts right, and to reason instrumentally, including weighing the facts 
appropriately and according to a minimally coherent preference ordering.  Put yet another 
way, it is the ability to act for good reasons . . . .”) (citation omitted). 
30.  Indeterminism is the negation of determinism.  Determinism is the theory that 
every state of the universe is uniquely necessitated by the immediately preceding state in 
conjunction with the laws of nature.  Therefore every event, including every action, that 
happens had to happen and could not have happened otherwise.  See WALLACE, supra note 
27, at 181.     
31.  See, e.g., KANE, supra note 27; Peter van Inwagen, A Promising Argument, in 
THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF FREE WILL 475 (Robert Kane ed., 2d ed. 2011). 
32.  See, e.g., DENNETT, ELBOW ROOM, supra note 27; DENNETT, FREEDOM 
EVOLVES, supra note 27; Bernard Berofsky, Compatibilism Without Frankfurt: 
Dispositional Analyses of Free Will, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF FREE WILL 153 
(Robert Kane ed., 2d ed. 2011); Michael McKenna, Contemporary Compatibilism: Mesh 
Theories and Reasons-Responsive Theories, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF FREE WILL 
175 (Robert Kane, ed., 2d ed. 2011); Paul Russell, Moral Sense and the Foundations of 
Responsibility, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF FREE WILL 200 (Robert Kane, ed., 2d ed. 
2011);  Peter Strawson, Freedom and Resentment, 48 PROC. BRIT. ACAD. 1 (1962), 
reprinted in PERSPECTIVES ON MORAL RESPONSIBILITY 45 (John Martin Fischer & Mark 
Ravizza eds., 1993); Christopher Taylor & Daniel Dennett, Who’s Still Afraid of 
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kinds of responsibility but not for others.33  But because this 
issue leads down the road of metaphysics and away from the 
very practical purposes of the criminal justice system, we may 
sidestep it and adhere to the point established above: 
responsibility at its core—a particular act (or omission) in 
conjunction with a set of threshold rational, cognitive, and 
volitional capacities—is all that is necessary for just blame and 
punishment. 
There are two drawbacks to this approach.  First, it fails to 
address the concerns of philosophers who believe that genuine 
responsibility is metaphysically impossible and therefore that 
nobody, not even the most violent criminal, is genuinely 
blameworthy for anything.  Skeptics subscribe to this 
counterintuitive approach for one of two reasons:  they believe 
that either (a) responsibility is incompatible with the only two 
options, determinism and indeterminism; or (b) being the 
ultimate causes of our actions is both necessary for 
responsibility and metaphysically impossible.34  From either 
 
Determinism? Rethinking Causes and Possibilities, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF FREE 
WILL 235 (Robert Kane ed., 2d ed. 2011). 
33.  See MELE, supra note 27, at 95 (“A theorist may leave it open that free action 
and moral responsibility are compatible with determinism but maintain that the falsity of 
determinism is required for a more desirable species of free action and a more desirable 
brand of moral responsibility.  This is a soft libertarian line.”). 
34.  See generally DOUBLE, supra note 27; HARRIS, supra note 27; PEREBOOM, supra 
note 27; WALLER, AGAINST, supra note 27; Galen Strawson, The Impossibility of Moral 
Responsibility, 75 PHIL. STUD. 5, 7 (1994) (arguing that “true moral responsibility is 
impossible, because it requires true self-determination”).  According to “responsibility 
skeptics,” responsibility requires one condition that is metaphysically impossible and a 
second condition that is incompatible with the first (already impossible) condition.  See 
Ken Levy, The Main Problem with USC Libertarianism, 105 PHIL. STUD. 107, 110-15 
(2001).  The first condition is my being the ultimate author, the ultimate uncaused cause, of 
my reasons and actions.  See id. at 114.  This condition is metaphysically impossible 
because every person is thrust into this world by forces outside her control.  See id.  And 
while each person eventually acquires control over her actions, the self that is taking this 
control was not shaped by itself but rather by its previous self, the nature of which was 
determined not by itself but rather by genes, personality, and environment.  So these early 
choices are really not self-determined—or are determined by a self that was not itself self-
determined.  Therefore the self that results from these choices is no more self-determined 
either.  And (therefore) so on for all future choices.  The second condition, which is 
incompatible with the first condition, is that the things I do—including the reasons that I 
adopt and actions that I perform—are not random or undetermined but are themselves 
motivated by reasons.  This second condition is incompatible with the first because it 
suggests that reasons, not I myself, are the ultimate causes of my actions.  Given that these 
two conditions are necessary for genuine responsibility and (doubly) impossible to fulfill, it 
follows that the offender is no more responsible or blameworthy for her law-breaking 
behavior than the upright, ordinary person is responsible for her law-abiding behavior.  
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proposition, (a) or (b), it follows that every person whom the 
criminal justice system punishes is blameless.35  And, again, 
punishing the blameless is supposed to be just as wrong, just as 
unfair, as punishing the innocent (i.e., non-wrongdoers), at least 
according to the Blameless Wrongdoer Argument in Part II.B. 
Second, even if we wholeheartedly believe that the criminal 
justice system’s operating concept of responsibility—again, a set 
of threshold rational, cognitive, and volitional capacities—is 
correct, there is still the great difficulty of applying this concept.  
Application of the concept of responsibility is difficult because 
we cannot hope to sift out the genuinely blameworthy from the 
genuinely blameless wrongdoers until we first figure out what 
the thresholds are for each capacity and therefore how 
diminished these capacities may become before we deem the 
agent non-responsible.  This task, separating those whose 
thresholds are satisfied from those whose thresholds are not 
satisfied, is difficult to say the least.  Because capacities cannot 
be measured in discrete quantities like pounds and inches, we 
cannot precisely quantify these thresholds or precisely determine 
if any particular person whose responsibility we question falls 
below them.36 
 
Both are equally the “victims” or passive “playthings” of “constitutive” luck and 
“circumstantial” luck—the luck of genetic inheritance, personality, environment, and the 
constant interaction between these three things as one’s life progresses. 
35.  I develop the skeptic’s argument further below in Part II.E. 
36.  See United States v. Lyons, 731 F.2d 243, 248-49 (5th Cir. 1984) (en banc) (“[A] 
majority of psychiatrists now believe that they do not possess sufficient accurate scientific 
bases for measuring a person’s capacity for self-control or for calibrating the impairment of 
that capacity. . . .  [I]t may be that some day tools will be discovered with which reliable 
conclusions about human volition can be fashioned.  It appears to be all but a certainty, 
however, that despite earlier hopes they do not lie in our hands today.”); Stephen R. 
McAllister, Some Reflections on the Constitutionality of Sex Offender Commitment Laws, 
50 U. KAN. L. REV. 1011, 1020 (2002) (“[T]he medical and scientific reality is that 
volitional control is a matter of degree that is impossible to measure or establish.”); 
Stephen J. Morse, Uncontrollable Urges and Irrational People, 88 VA. L. REV. 1025, 1060 
(2002) [hereinafter Morse, Uncontrollable Urges] (“In basic and clinical science . . . there 
is no consensus about the conceptual meaning, the definition, or the measurement of these 
terms.”); id. at 1061-62 (“[G]ood objective measures of the operative terms, such as 
tension and arousal, often do not exist, and thus make valid empirical research impossible. . 
. .  Even when the research is good, in the absence of a successful account of 
‘uncontrollability,’ research cannot tell us whether failure to resist is ‘controllable’ because 
the research concerns human action and not mechanisms.  This research does not 
investigate how many ‘desire units’ are necessary mechanically to flip the ‘action switch.’ . 
. .  [W]e have no scientific measure of whether, ultimately, an agent can control himself . . . 
.”) (footnote omitted); id. at 1062-63 (“Loss of control as a non-responsibility condition is 
so conceptually unclear and empirically unresolved that it invites unhelpful, potentially 
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It is for this reason—our inability to precisely measure or 
fathom threshold capacities, especially control—that some 
scholars, such as Stephen Morse, argue that the insanity defense 
should not contain a volitional prong; that we should not allow 
for the possibility that some defendants might be acquitted on 
the purported grounds that they fall beneath the volitional 
threshold required for responsibility as a result of mental disease 
or defect.37 
D. The Sympathy Argument 
Responsibility is problematic in both theory and 
application.  Yet we stubbornly hang on to it and insist that a 
threshold quantity of it is necessary for just blame and 
punishment.  The best explanation of this insistence—and 
therefore the best answer to the central question of this Part 
(why is responsibility thought to be necessary for just blame and 
punishment?)—is not the Blameless Wrongdoer Argument (in 
Part II.B).  Rather, it is the “Sympathy Argument.”  The 
Sympathy Argument falls into two parts.  The first part is that 
blameless wrongdoers should not be punished not because they 
are innocent but because their “causal situation,” the primary 
internal and external factors that led to their committing a crime, 
 
misleading, and conclusory expert testimony when it is raised. . . .  [Expert opinions] are 
clearly not based on expert, scientifically, or clinically grounded understandings or 
measurements of lack of control.”); Morse, Culpability and Control, supra note 27, at 1601 
n.47 (“I conclude that we lack the technology validly to measure the strength of impulses 
and impulsiveness.”); id. at 1657 (“[F]amously, we cannot distinguish between irresistible 
impulses and those impulses simply not resisted.  No established metric exists to determine 
the magnitude of impulses, desires, or feelings. . . .  I know of no such measurement system 
with established validity.  Furthermore, it is difficult to disentangle the strength of desires, 
the strength of temptations, and the capacity for self-control.”) (footnote omitted); James 
D. A. Parker & R. Michael Bagby, Impulsivity in Adults: A Critical Review of 
Measurement Approaches, in IMPULSIVITY: THEORY, ASSESSMENT, AND TREATMENT 142, 
142 (Christopher D. Webster & Margaret A. Jackson eds., 1997) (“Since there exists little 
consensus in the literature about what constitutes impulsivity, the low correlations among 
different impulsivity measures reflects the diversity of theoretical approaches to this 
construct.”) (citation omitted). 
37.  See Morse, Uncontrollable Urges, supra note 36, at 1054-63; Morse, Culpability 
and Control, supra note 27, at 1599-1602; Stephen J. Morse, Excusing the Crazy: The 
Insanity Defense Reconsidered, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 777, 812 (1985) (“I believe that the 
relationship of mental disorder to compulsion is frustratingly vague, and that there is no 
such special or necessary relationship. . . .  Acts influenced by mental disorder are not 
reflexive, unconscious, or the like; crazy persons may have crazy reasons for their actions, 
but their acts are clearly products of conscious effort or determination.”) (footnote 
omitted). 
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are sufficiently unusual and unfortunate that we sympathize with 
them.38  The second part is that, because we sympathize with 
blameless wrongdoers, we should regard their being punished as 
just as “unfitting”—that is, just as inappropriate and 
unwarranted—as punishing the innocent.39 
The crucial role that sympathy plays here cannot be 
overstated.  The criminal justice system generally reflects our 
particular moral psychology.40  We human beings—or possibly 
just we intellectual descendants of western culture (and much 
eastern culture)—predicate punishment on blameworthy 
wrongdoing,41 and we predicate blameworthy wrongdoing in 
turn on three things:  (a) norms of wrongful behavior; (b) the 
satisfaction of threshold psychological—i.e., rational, cognitive, 
and volitional—capacities; and (c) the absence of certain 
situational constraints.  The reasons we care about capacities and 
situational constraints in addition to just norms of wrongful 
behavior are as much psychological as metaphysical.  We have a 
certain picture of what a human being is and is capable of, and 
we have different attitudes, usually sympathy or compassion, 
 
38.  See Robinson, supra note 4, at 74 (emphasizing the role of sympathy in our 
intuitions about punishment and retributive justice); cf. Morse, Culpability and Control, 
supra note 27, at 1653-54 (“If deprivation or rotten social background does not satisfy 
standard criteria for excuse, what is the basis of the powerful intuition that deprived agents 
should be excused?  The true basis, I believe, is sympathy for those who have suffered.  
Although such responses are understandable because sympathy is entirely appropriate, 
deprivation is nevertheless not clearly relevant to responsibility ascriptions, and the proper 
legal response to the rational and uncoerced but relevantly deprived criminal is 
problematic.”). 
39.  See WALLACE, supra note 27, at 2 (“I postulate a close connection between 
holding someone responsible and a central class of moral sentiments, those of resentment, 
indignation, and guilt.  To hold someone responsible, I argue, is essentially to be subject to 
emotions of this class in one’s dealings with the person.”). 
40.  See Strawson, supra note 32, at 63-64 (“[S]avage or civilized, we have some 
belief in the utility of practices of condemnation and punishment. . . .  [There is] something 
vital in our conception of these practices.  The vital thing can be restored by attending to 
that complicated web of attitudes and feelings which form an essential part of the moral life 
as we know it. . . .  Only by attending to this range of attitudes can we recover from the 
facts as we know them a sense of what we mean, i.e. of all we mean, when, speaking the 
language of morals, we speak of desert, responsibility, guilt, condemnation, and justice.”); 
Levy, supra note 20, at 656-57 (“[O]ur widespread belief in retributive justice is very much 
a reflection of our general moral psychology. . . .  Without this particular, if not peculiar, 
psychological configuration, retributive justice would not be justice in the first place.”).  
But see Robinson, supra note 4, at 65 (“[T]he most recent set of studies show that many 
modern crime-control doctrines seriously conflict with the community’s shared intuitions 
of justice . . . .”). 
41.  See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
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toward people who do not measure up to this metaphysical 
picture. 
I contend that it is this sympathy, this compassion, that 
primarily motivates our practice of excusing, and creating rules 
that excuse, blameless wrongdoers from punishment.  When we 
say that it just does not seem “right” or “fair” to punish 
somebody who is not responsible for her behavior, it is 
ultimately sympathy that is motivating this position.42  It would 
be particularly unsympathetic—indeed, callous or cruel—to 
punish somebody who we know was more worthy of sympathy 
than of indifference or hostility.  In this way, contrary to the 
common wisdom, the argument against blaming and punishing 
the blameless is much less a matter of strict logic than it is a 
matter of rough ethical intuition and emotion. 
E. Criminal Punishment Does Not Necessarily Require 
Responsibility 
For all we know, we are already punishing blameless 
wrongdoers every day on a massive scale.  Indeed, it may very 
well just be that no offender, much less any other person, is 
genuinely responsible for her actions.43  Yet we are still doing 
the right thing in blaming and punishing offenders.  We are 
certainly doing the right thing for an obvious consequentialist 
reason:  minimizing future crimes.44  But we are also doing the 
right thing for retributivist reasons. 
My last point (about retributivism) is contrary to the 
assumption that many or most retributivists make—namely, that 
retributivism requires or presupposes genuine responsibility as a 
necessary condition of inflicting just blame and punishment.45  I 
maintain instead that if an offender knowingly and willingly 
committed a crime, she deserves criminal punishment—even if 
the skeptics are right that genuine responsibility is 
metaphysically impossible.  The offender committed a criminal 
act.  This fact is important even if the self from which the 
offender’s action emanated did not itself originate from her. 
 
42.  See supra note 38 and accompanying text. 
43.  See supra note 34 and accompanying text. 
44.  See supra note 16 and accompanying text.   
45.  See Levy, supra note 20, at 644-45. 
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Yes, it is very sad that the offender was made into this 
knowing, willing, crime-committing agent by factors outside her 
control—namely, her genes, personality, environment, and their 
constant interaction.  And, yes, it is to some extent unfair to seek 
this kind of retaliation against a person who ultimately (given 
her genes, personality, environment, and their constant 
interaction) could not help it.  But, first, even though she 
arguably could not have done otherwise, she was not externally 
compelled or threatened; rather, she chose on her own to commit 
the crime.46 
Second, it is usually even sadder what offenders do to their 
victims and therefore more unfair to acquit them.  The offenders 
may or may not have suffered prior to injuring their victims.  
The victims, however, certainly did suffer.  And the fact that the 
offenders caused this suffering with an inappropriate attitude—
for example, excessive anger or amusement or indifference—is 
sufficient to warrant retaliation against them on behalf of the 
victims whose suffering the offenders did not care enough about.  
It is reason enough to “pay them back,” to “teach them a 
lesson.”  Inflicting punishment on the offenders, even if they 
were not genuinely responsible for their criminal acts, will help 
at least to some extent to right the moral imbalance that the 
offenders created when they committed their crimes.47 
Just as we feel great sympathy for the blameless wrongdoer 
whom we judge to be incapable of living up to society’s moral 
and legal standards,48 we also feel great sympathy for the victim 
of any wrongdoer, blameless or blameworthy.  After all, she has 
 
46.  See A.J. AYER, Freedom and Necessity, in PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS 271, 282 
(1954) (“[T]o say that I could have acted otherwise is to say, first, that I should have acted 
otherwise if I had so chosen; secondly, that my action was voluntary in the sense in which 
the actions, say, of the kleptomaniac are not; and thirdly, that nobody compelled me to 
choose as I did . . . .  When [these three conditions] are fulfilled, I may be said to have 
acted freely.”). 
47.  Levy, supra note 20, at 655-56 (“When the state punishes a criminal, . . . [it] is 
reducing the criminal’s rights and powers to roughly the same degree that he previously 
reduced the victim’s rights and power when he committed the crime.  While the perpetrator 
indicated through his crime that his rights and interests were superior to his victim’s, 
criminal punishment negates that message and puts the perpetrator back into his non-
superior, equal position.  By restoring the equality between perpetrator and victim, by 
communicating that the perpetrator’s rights and interests are not superior to his victim’s 
rights and interests, criminal punishment helps to restore not metaphysical equilibrium but 
moral and social equilibrium.  The emotional equilibrium then follows this restoration of 
the moral and social order.”) (footnote omitted). 
48.  See supra Part II.D. 
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needlessly suffered harm (e.g., death, physical injury, or 
emotional injury) at somebody else’s hands.  Indeed, this is 
largely what criminal punishment is about:  expressing this 
sympathy by retaliating against the offender, exacting as much 
sacrifice or suffering from the offender as the offender initially 
exacted from the victim, and thereby balancing out their 
situations, “righting the wrong” that the offender inflicted on the 
victim.49 
Importantly, my arguments here operate under the skeptical 
assumption that offenders, and people generally, are not 
genuinely responsible for their actions.  But this background 
assumption may not be true; in fact, it is very likely untrue.  The 
standard common-sense presumption that we do bear genuine 
responsibility for our behavior is more plausible.  So if, as I have 
just tried to show, blame and punishment are just even in a 
world of non-responsibility, then they are that much more 
(plausibly) just in a world of responsibility, which is what this 
world is if the “responsibility skeptics” are wrong. 
III.  DANGEROUS PSYCHOPATHS, MORAL 
RESPONSIBILITY, AND CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY 
In Part II, I argued that just criminal punishment does not 
require responsibility.  Still, criminal punishment does require 
criminal responsibility.  It follows, then, that criminal 
punishment does not require another kind of responsibility: 
moral responsibility. 
In Dangerous Psychopaths,50 I used the example of 
psychopaths—people who are neurologically incapable of 
genuine compassion, remorse, and guilt—to argue that even if 
individuals are not morally responsible for their criminal acts, it 
may still be just to hold them criminally responsible, and 
therefore criminally punishable, for them.51  After explicating 
 
49.  See supra note 47 and accompanying text. 
50.  Levy, supra note 5.   
51.  See id. at 1328-29, 1362-75; see also Peter Arenella, Convicting the Morally 
Blameless: Reassessing the Relationship Between Legal and Moral Accountability, 39 
UCLA L. REV. 1511, 1513 (1992) (“Our criminal justice system need not and frequently 
does not make criminal liability dependent on some showing that the offender deserves 
moral blame for what he has done.”); id. at 1525 (“[T]he criminal law does not always 
honor its promise to exempt the morally blameless from criminal liability.  It permits the 
conviction of some offenders who should not qualify as morally accountable actors . . . .”); 
id. at 1526 (“[The processes of the criminal law] are ill-suited for determining whether 
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the conditions of moral responsibility and the conditions of 
criminal responsibility, I offered several arguments for the 
conclusion that psychopaths do not satisfy all of the conditions 
of moral responsibility52 and an argument that psychopaths still 
satisfy all of the conditions of criminal responsibility.53  From 
these arguments, I ultimately concluded that, even if 
psychopaths are not morally responsible for their criminal acts, 
they are still criminally responsible, and therefore criminally 
punishable, for them.  Therefore, more generally, criminal 
responsibility does not require moral responsibility. 
For the purposes of this article, the respective conditions of 
moral and criminal responsibility are the most important.  So I 
will reiterate them here.  In Dangerous Psychopaths, I argued 
that the four conditions of moral responsibility are: 
(1) knowledge, or a threshold capacity to know, that a 
given action “A” is morally wrong; 
(2) a threshold capacity to refrain from A-ing; 
(3) control over A-ing; and 
(4) an absence of circumstances that excuse this 
performance.54 
And the four conditions of criminal responsibility are: 
(5) knowledge, or a threshold capacity to know, the 
(relevant) criminal law “C”; 
(6) a threshold capacity to refrain from violating C; 
(7) control over violating C; and 
 
offenders qualify as moral agents. Nor can we afford to exempt dangerous but morally 
blameless offenders from criminal liability and punishment . . .”); id. at 1616 (“[A]ny 
attempt to link criminal culpability more closely to a persuasive account of moral agency 
would generate significant ideological, financial, and administrative costs. . . .  [T]he law’s 
expectation that most criminals were morally accountable actors could be subjected to 
constant challenge.”); id. at 1622 (“[T]he impoverished conception of moral agency that 
animates many criminal law doctrines permit conviction and punishment in the absence of 
moral desert. We appear unwilling to acknowledge openly that we sometimes punish the 
morally blameless or that our conception of justice to the individual sometimes 
encompasses concerns apart from the offender's moral desert.”); John Hasnas, Once More 
Unto the Breach: The Inherent Liberalism of the Criminal Law and Liability for Attempting 
the Impossible, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 45-54 (2002) (arguing that moral responsibility and 
criminal responsibility are generally conflated). 
52.  Levy, supra note 5, at 1332-44. 
53.  Id. at 1362-75. 
54.  Id. at 1329. 
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(8) an absence of circumstances that excuse this 
violation.55 
I drew these sets of conditions from the criminal law, 
scholarship on moral and criminal responsibility, and common 
sense.  I will return to these conditions below in Part VI. 
One might argue that control either requires the ability to 
do otherwise or amounts to the very same thing as the ability to 
do otherwise and therefore that conditions (3) and (7) render (2) 
and (6) respectively redundant.  But this objection is simply 
false.  A person may exhibit control over her action even if she 
could not have refrained from performing it.56 
To support this point, I offer two examples.  First, suppose 
that I am driving my car well; I am not high or drunk or 
otherwise mentally incapacitated.  So I have control over my 
action.  Suppose further that I want to commit suicide by 
swerving into oncoming traffic.  I keep trying to work up the 
courage, but I just cannot bring myself to do it.  I find it 
psychologically impossible to cross the median.  The fact that I 
find it psychologically impossible to cross the median hardly 
shows that I lack control over my driving.  Quite the contrary; it 
shows just the opposite—that I do have control, though more 
control than I would like.  We have, then, a situation in which I 
have control and yet cannot do otherwise. 
A more controversial example is addiction.57  Even if an 
addict cannot resist her addictive urge, it is arguably false to say 
that she does not exhibit control over the action that this urge 
motivates.  Suppose that I am addicted to nicotine.  Several 
hours after my last cigarette, I develop an increasingly intense 
craving for another.  I try to resist this craving for ten to fifteen 
 
55.  Id. at 1363. 
56.  See generally Frankfurt, Alternate Possibilities, supra note 27 (arguing for the 
similar point that responsibility does not require the ability to do otherwise); Ken Levy, 
Why It Is Sometimes Fair To Blame Agents for Unavoidable Actions and Omissions, 42 
AM. PHIL. Q. 93, 94-99 (2005) (same). 
57.  See ARTIE LANGE, CRASH AND BURN (2013) (describing how difficult it is to 
quit using heroin despite all of its self-destructive side effects); FRANCIS F. SEEBURGER, 
ADDICTION AND RESPONSIBILITY: AN INQUIRY INTO THE ADDICTIVE MIND 10 (1993) 
(“The deeper one sinks into addiction, the more desperate becomes the pain and agitation 
and need when one is deprived of that to which one has become addicted, and the greater is 
the eventual sense of relief when that deprivation is lifted.”); id. at 19 (“[A]ddiction seems 
to take on a life of its own, independent of the desires and decisions of the addict.  It is as if 
the addiction were an external force acting inexorably on the addict, as inexorably as an 
avalanche sweeps over whomever is unfortunate enough to be in its way.”). 
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minutes, but withdrawal symptoms—anxiety, irritability, 
fatigue, headaches, nausea, and an inability to concentrate—start 
to kick in.  And I know that they will only get worse the longer I 
deny myself a cigarette.  With this knowledge in mind, I give 
up, reach into my desk drawer, and light up.  Given that I 
deliberately performed this action—grabbing a cigarette and 
lighting up—on my own, I had control over it.  Yet I very 
arguably could not have done otherwise.  My intense nicotine 
craving in combination with my dread of intensifying 
withdrawal symptoms conspired to make resisting my desire to 
smoke psychologically impossible.  So, once again, control does 
not necessarily entail a threshold capacity to refrain. 
IV.  THE EXCUSES 
The central question in this article is whether or not 
situationism qualifies as a good excuse.  In order to answer this 
question, we first need to know what kinds of reasons for acting 
qualify as good excuses.  In this Part, I will present Stephen 
Morse’s theory of the excuses, indicate the main respects in 
which I differ from Morse, and offer an alternative theory.58 
A. Stephen Morse’s Dualist Theory of the Excuses 
Morse’s theory of the excuses is “dualist.”  He believes that 
there is a fundamental, irreducible dichotomy between two kinds 
of excuses:  nonculpable irrationality (represented best by 
insanity) and nonculpable hard choice (represented best by 
duress).59  By inserting “nonculpable” before “irrationality” and 
“hard choice,” Morse means to suggest that the person is not 
responsible for being irrational or being in a hard-choice 
situation, which is why these conditions are excuses in the first 
place.60 
Morse advocates developing two generic excuses that 
correspond to the duality between irrationality and hard choice.  
 
58.  I base most of my discussion in this Part on Morse, supra note 29; see also 
Stephen J. Morse, Psychopathy and the Law: The United States Experience, in 
RESPONSIBILITY AND PSYCHOPATHY: INTERFACING LAW, PSYCHIATRY, AND PHILOSOPHY 
41, 48-49 (Luca Malatesti & John McMillan eds., 2010). 
59.  See Morse, supra note 29, at 334.  But see LARRY ALEXANDER & KIMBERLY 
KESSLER FERZAN, CRIME AND CULPABILITY: A THEORY OF CRIMINAL LAW 139-41 
(2009) (proposing alternatives to the hard-choice account of the duress defense). 
60.  See Morse, supra note 29, at 341. 
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These generic excuses are designed to cover not only insanity 
and duress but also every other excuse, recognized and 
unrecognized, that involves nonculpable hard choice or 
nonculpable irrationality: 
[T]he specific excuses the law now includes are too 
limited. . . .  [T]he criminal law should adopt two generic 
excuses: the general incapacity for rationality or normative 
competence and hard choice.  This proposal would enable 
the law more rationally to consider any reasonable claim 
and relevant evidence that might satisfy the underlying 
reasons for excusing, and it would permit defendants to 
avoid the unreasonable strictures of existing excusing 
doctrine, which is generally tied to a medical model of 
abnormality.61 
[N]onculpable irrationality and nonculpable hard choice 
should excuse whether or not the irrationality was produced 
by mental disorder or the hard choice was occasioned by a 
human threat.  Variables such as mental disorder or human 
threat would no longer be necessary criteria of excuse; 
instead they would simply be evidentiary considerations 
bearing on whether the defendant was nonculpably 
irrational or faced a hard choice at the time of the crime.62 
Morse adopts this dualist position rather than the “monist” 
position that all recognized excuses are explained by 
irrationality or “normative incompetence” for the simple reason 
that normative incompetence does not explain why hard choice 
is an excuse.  The reason for recognizing hard choice as an 
excuse is not that the person who committed a crime in a hard-
choice situation was normatively incompetent but just the 
opposite:  given the hard choice she faced, it is actually her 
normative competence that motivated her to commit a crime.  In 
other words, far from being normatively incompetent, the person 
who commits a crime in the face of a hard choice acted 
rationally; she performed the act that she reasonably believed 
would cause less harm to herself or another.63 
 
61.  Id. at 390-91. 
62.  Id. at 391. 
63.  See id. at 341 (“Compulsion involves a wrongful hard choice that produces a 
threat that a rational, otherwise responsible agent faces.  If she yields to the threat, it will 
not be because she does not understand the legal rule or what she is doing or because the 
threat turned her into an automaton.  She knows it is wrong and acts intentionally precisely 
to avoid the threatened harm.  The killing is clearly action and satisfies most normative 
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Although Morse’s dualist proposal is plausible and well 
defended, I think that there are several problems with it.  First, 
nonculpable irrationality is over-inclusive because there are 
many instances in which nonculpable irrationality motivates a 
crime but we still believe that the person should be punished, not 
excused.  For example, the seven deadly sins—greed, sloth, 
anger, lust, pride, envy, and gluttony—are rarely thought to 
excuse criminal acts.64  Yet many people are motivated to 
commit crimes, often serious crimes, by at least one of these, 
and these motives are often both irrational (i.e., excessive or 
self-destructive) and nonculpably possessed (i.e., acquired 
through some combination of genes, personality, and 
environment). 
Second, Morse’s notion of nonculpable irrationality is also 
under-inclusive.  By “rationality,” Morse means: 
[A] congeries of perceptual, cognitive, and affective 
abilities. . . .  [M]ost generally it includes the ability . . . “to 
be sensitive and responsive to relevant changes in one’s 
situation and environment—that is, to be flexible.”  It is the 
ability to perceive accurately, to get the facts right, and to 
reason instrumentally, including weighing the facts 
appropriately and according to a minimally coherent 
preference ordering. . . .  [I]t is the ability to act for good 
reasons, and it is always a good reason not to act (or to act) 
if doing so (or not doing so) will be wrong. . . .  The general 
normative capacity to be able to grasp and be guided by 
reason is sufficient.65 
Irrationality, then, is the absence of at least one of these 
abilities.  While this conception of irrationality seems correct, it 
has much narrower extension than Morse suggests.  
Nonculpable irrationality extends to insanity alone.  Contrary to 
Morse, it does not extend to a whole number of other excuses—
 
notions of rationality.  Still, society, acting through its legal rules governing such cases, 
might decide that some choices are too hard fairly to expect the agent to behave properly 
and that people will be excused for making the wrong choice.”). 
64.  See Kevin Bennardo, Of Ordinariness and Excuse: Heat-of-Passion and the 
Seven Deadly Sins, 36 CAP. U. L. REV. 675, 689-92 (2008) (arguing that the mere fact that 
ordinary people might experience a particular wrongful passion in a particular situation 
does not automatically excuse their acting on this passion). 
65.  Morse, supra note 29, at 392 (citation omitted); see also Stephen J. Morse, 
Reason, Results, and Criminal Responsibility, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 363, 382 (2004) 
[hereinafter Morse, Reason, Results] (noting the “general capacities generally thought to 
ground ordinary responsibility, such as the capacity to grasp and be guided by reason”).  
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for example, infancy, hypnotism, involuntary intoxication, and 
automatism.66  Instead, what covers not only insanity but also 
infancy, hypnotism, involuntary intoxication, and automatism is 
not (nonculpable) irrationality per se, as Morse suggests, but 
rather something different—namely, the fact that these 
conditions make it difficult or impossible for the agent either to 
know better or to act better.  And an inability to act better is not 
necessarily a problem of irrationality. 
Irrationality usually applies more to cognitive and 
emotional impairment than to perceptual or volitional 
impairment.67  And even an inability to know better is not 
necessarily a problem of irrationality.  For example, 
indoctrination or religious zealotry may lead some people to 
believe that certain activities—for example, terrorism—are 
either morally permissible or even morally obligatory.68  This 
belief is false, but possession of this belief hardly indicates that 
the person who holds it is irrational.  Her belief is rational given 
the premises and the “evidence” that have been drilled into her 
head.69 
 
66.  Morse, Reason, Results, supra note 65, at 375.   
67.  See United States v. Lyons, 731 F.2d 243, 249 (1984) (“Most psychotic persons 
who fail a volitional test would also fail a cognitive test, thus rendering the volitional test 
superfluous for them.”); Captain Vaughan E. Taylor, Building the Cuckoo’s Nest, ARMY 
LAWYER 32, 37-38 (1978) (“The words ‘mental disease or defect’ . . . comprehend[] those 
irrational states of mind which are the result of deterioration, destruction, or malfunction of 
the mental, as distinguished from the moral, faculties.  The key word here is mental, as 
opposed to any other type of defect, such as a defect of morals, character, behavior, 
development, or culture.”). 
68.  See Robinson, supra note 4, at 66 (“[I]ndoctrination techniques follow a series of 
stages in which the subject is first isolated, then disoriented through malnutrition and 
constant provocation of anxiety, and finally made to participate in symbolic acts of self-
betrayal.  This renders the subject’s previous personality subject to degradation.  The 
captors then build up a new personality, one that agrees with the belief structure of the 
indoctrinators, by offering positive reinforcement when the subject expresses the desired 
views.  Eventually, the subject does not feel manipulated and comes to truly hold the 
beliefs of his captors.”) (footnotes omitted). 
69.  See LAWRENCE SUSSKIND & PATRICK FIELD, DEALING WITH AN ANGRY 
PUBLIC: THE MUTUAL GAINS APPROACH TO RESOLVING DISPUTES 18 (1996) (“It simply 
doesn’t matter whether you think that someone else’s anger is rational or irrational.  
Someone else’s behavior may appear bizarre to you, but from where they are standing, 
‘zealots’ see their outrage as quite logical and rational.”); Stephen J. Morse, The 
Jurisprudence of Craziness, in THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF IRRATIONAL BEHAVIOR 225, 
256 (Francesco Parisi & Vernon L. Smith eds., 2005) (distinguishing between rational and 
irrational terrorists); Jeffrey F. Addicott, American Punitive Damages vs. Compensatory 
Damages in Promoting Enforcement in Democratic Nations of Civil Judgments to Deter 
State-Sponsors of Terrorism, 5 U. MASS. ROUNDTABLE SYMP. L.J. 89, 94 (2010) (“It is 
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Likewise, the reason why infancy is an excuse is not 
because children are irrational—that is, not because they are 
unable to “think straight.”  Infancy is an excuse because we 
cannot reasonably expect children to know better or behave 
better, where this lack of knowledge or control is due not 
necessarily to irrationality but much more often to lack of 
maturity, experience, or education.70  For example, a young 
child may not fully appreciate how wrongful and dangerous it is 
to throw rocks at moving cars not because she is irrational but 
because nobody ever taught her better or because she did know 
better but was not mature enough to resist her temptation to 
enjoy the thrill of breaking the rules, tempting fate, and testing 
her throwing abilities.  Indeed, this is the reason why we excuse 
her, at least from criminal punishment—assuming that the harm 
is not too great.  We cannot expect her to behave better, to 
behave like an adult, given her inability to fully understand and 
appreciate the moral and legal consequences of her action.  
 
sometimes said that terrorism is a mindless and irrational activity.  This conclusion is 
absolutely false.  The reality of modern terrorism is the exact opposite.  Terrorism is the 
premeditated use of unlawful violence calculated to, as the old Chinese saw relates, ‘kill 
one and frighten ten thousand.’”); Laura Nader, Rethinking Salvation Mentality and 
Counterterrorism, 21 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 99, 111 (2012) (“[T]he average 
U.S. citizen does not have insight into U.S. covert warfare, so in the absence of that insight 
retaliatory acts appear irrational, which fits the media profile of ‘the terrorist.’”); Jide 
Nzelibe, Courting Genocide: The Unintended Effects of Humanitarian Intervention, 97 
CAL. L. REV. 1171, 1181-82 (2009) (“Much . . . political science scholarship assumes, at 
least implicitly, that perpetrators often act rationally when they deploy genocidal violence 
against their weaker adversaries.  That is, rather than acting out of a fanatical or irrational 
impulse to harm another ethnic group, dominant groups tend to use genocidal violence 
strategically in order to coerce minority rebel groups to drop their military demands.”) 
(footnote omitted); Ehud Sprinzak, Rational Fanatics, 120 FOREIGN POL’Y 66, 66 (Nov. 
20, 2009) (“Whereas the press lost no time in labeling [the 1983 Beirut barracks bombers] 
irrational zealots, terrorism specialists offered a more nuanced appraisal, arguing that 
suicide terrorism has inherent tactical advantages over ‘conventional’ terrorism.”); id. at 73 
(“The perception that terrorists are undeterrable fanatics who are willing to kill millions 
indiscriminately just to sow fear and chaos belies the reality that they are cold, rational 
killers who employ violence to achieve specific political objectives.”); D.A. Jeremy 
Telman, Non-State Actors in the Middle East: A Challenge for Rationalist Legal Theory, 
46 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 51, 62 (2013) (“Rationalist theory can quite easily accommodate 
both rogue states (if there are any such entities in the contemporary Middle East) and terror 
groups, as demonstrated by the relatively rich literature on the self-interested conduct of 
individual terrorists and terror organizations.”). 
70.  See Elizabeth Couffman & Laurence Steinberg, Researching Adolescents’ 
Judgment and Culpability, in YOUTH TRIAL: A DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVE ON 
JUVENILE JUSTICE 325, 325 (2000). 
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Again, none of this necessarily has anything to do with 
irrationality. 
Third, by limiting his theory of the excuses to nonculpable 
irrationality and nonculpable hard choice, Morse may be 
inadvertently excluding other conditions and circumstances that 
do not fall into either category, but would still qualify as a 
plausible excuse.  For example, in Parts V and VI, I will discuss 
what I take to be a very plausible candidate—situationism.  I 
will also argue, however, that situationism does not implicate 
irrationality or hard choice.  Still, I will argue that situationism 
should not be added to the list of recognized excuses.  Morse 
might respond that my rejection of situationism merely proves 
his point, that the reason situationism should not be added to the 
list of recognized excuses is precisely because it does not fit into 
the irrationality or hard-choice camps.  But, I will argue that 
situationism should be rejected not for this reason but rather for 
a number of other reasons. 
Fourth, Morse’s attempt to show that psychopathy is 
fundamentally a problem of irrationality and therefore a 
(potentially) good excuse is not entirely convincing.  Morse 
adopts, in rather ad hoc fashion, a new criterion for rationality or 
normative competence—emotional understanding as opposed to 
cognitive understanding—and then argues that because 
psychopaths lack this emotional understanding of moral and 
legal rules, they should be excused for disobeying them.71  But, 
 
71.  See Morse, supra note 58, at 51 (“In brief, the argument for excusing 
psychopaths, or anyway some of them, is that they lack the strongest reasons for complying 
with the law, such as understanding that what they are doing is wrong and empathic 
understanding of their victim’s plight.”); Stephen J. Morse, Psychopathy and Criminal 
Responsibility, 1 NEUROETHICS 205, 205 (2008); Stephen J. Morse, Thoroughly Modern:  
Sir James Fitzjames Stephen on Criminal Responsibility, OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 505, 521 
(2008) (“Almost all philosophers think that psychopaths should be excused because they 
lack the central rational capacities necessary to behave well—the capacity to understand 
others' interests and the difference between right and wrong.”); Morse, Reason, Results, 
supra note 65, at 376; Stephen J. Morse, Rationality and Responsibility, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 
251, 264 (2000) (“I believe that [psychopaths] are morally irrational and should be 
excused. . . .  What could be a better reason not to harm another than full, emotional 
understanding of another's pain?  People who lack such understanding are, in my opinion, 
incapable of moral rationality and not part of our moral community.  They should not be 
held responsible, but if they are dangerous, they should be civilly confined to protect 
society.”) (footnote omitted); Stephen J. Morse, Immaturity and Irresponsibility, 88 J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 15, 26, 61 (1997) (“Perhaps people who lack the capacity for 
empathy and guilt—the so-called ‘psychopaths’—are particularly immoral and deserve 
special condemnation rather than excuse, but this does not seem fair.  To the best of our 
knowledge, some harmdoers simply lack these capacities and they are not amenable to 
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it is not at all clear that emotional understanding of a rule is 
necessary for rationality or normative competence.72  To be sure, 
if we stretch rationality or normative competence broadly 
enough, Morse is correct.  But that is just the point:  the success 
of Morse’s position on psychopathy depends on our stretching 
these concepts beyond what they normally, plausibly capture. 
B. A Monist Theory of the Excuses 
In this section, I will offer an alternative theory of the 
excuses, one that differs from Morse’s dualism.  I propose, in 
short, that what ties all of the existing, recognized excuses 
together is not the defendant’s normative incompetence (or hard 
choice) but society’s normative expectations.  The “theme” 
running through the currently recognized excuses is that they all 
point to conditions or circumstances that make it unreasonable 
for society to expect the defendant to have behaved otherwise, 
unreasonable for society to expect the defendant to have avoided 
committing the criminal act that she committed.73  Given this 
much, my proposal diverges from Morse’s dualist thesis in two 
respects:  (a) it is “monist;” and (b) it shifts the focus from the 
defendant, the potential excused, toward us, the excusers. 
According to my monist account of the excuses, the 
excuses as a whole embody this fundamental point:  it is more 
 
reason.  They may be dangerous people, but they are not part of our moral community. . . 
.”) (footnotes omitted); see also Samuel H. Pillsbury, Misunderstanding Provocation, 43 
U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 143, 158-59 (2009).  But see Jerome Hall, Mental Disease and 
Criminal Responsibility, 45 COL. L. REV. 677, 707 (1945) (implying that the notion that a 
person can have cognitive knowledge of a proposition without affective knowledge is 
untenable because the “affective, the cognitive, and the conative functions as well as all the 
others, inter-penetrate one another”).  
72.  See Levy, supra note 5, at 1362-70 (arguing that only a cognitive, not an 
emotional or affective, knowledge of the law is necessary for criminal responsibility); id. at 
1370-75 (arguing that psychopaths are sufficiently rational to be held criminally 
responsible for their criminal acts). 
73.  See Robinson, supra note 4, at 57 (“The conclusion of blamelessness comes from 
the existence of the excusing condition—the finding that the effect of the disability on the 
actor was so severe that we could not reasonably have expected him to have remained law-
abiding.”); cf. Joshua Dressler, Battered Women and Sleeping Abusers: Some Reflections, 3 
OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 457, 469 (2006) (“A no-fair-opportunity excuse claim is based on 
some external factor that acts on the individual in a way that convinces us that she did not 
have a fair opportunity to conform her conduct to the law . . . .  The key word here, of 
course, is fair.  This is a normative judgment. . . .  [T]his form of excuse recognizes that 
there is nothing wrong with the woman—what was ‘wrong’ were external circumstances 
that we believe, but for the grace of God, would probably have caused us, as well, to act 
unlawfully.”). 
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just that we refrain from punishing somebody whom we cannot 
reasonably expect to have refrained from committing a crime 
than that we simply vent our perfectly natural and 
understandable punitive impulses against her for committing this 
crime.74  Whether this balancing of values—the justice of 
excusing (because we cannot reasonably expect the agent to 
have avoided committing the crime) versus the justice of 
punishing (because the agent did commit the crime)—is correct 
is actually a very deep and difficult question.  The criminal 
justice system takes one position—namely, that we should 
excuse—and most blindly follow it.  But I think that one could 
very plausibly take the other side of it, at least when very close 
calls have to be made between blamelessness and 
blameworthiness.  I will develop this point further in Part VI. 
Underlying my monist thesis is not a dualism but a 
“triplism.”  Unlike Morse, who sees all excuses reducing to the 
two general conditions of nonculpable irrationality and 
nonculpable hard choice, I see all of the excuses as reducing to 
the non-fulfillment of three general normative expectations:  we 
cannot reasonably expect the person to have avoided committing 
the crime because (a) her (threshold capacity for) legal or moral 
knowledge was nonculpably deficient; (b) her control over her 
action was nonculpably impaired; or (c) her incentives for 
choosing otherwise (that is, for choosing to abide by the law) 
were nonculpably diminished by external conditions.  I will refer 
to all three of these general excusing conditions respectively as 
the Knowledge Constraint, the Volitional Constraint, and the 
Pressure Constraint. 
 
74.  See Sanford H. Kadish, Excusing Crime, 75 CAL. L. REV. 257, 279-80 (1987) 
(“[T]he concept of mental disease serves to identify so complete a breakdown of the 
normal human capacities of judgment and practical reason that the afflicted person cannot 
fairly be held liable. . . .  [H]e may nonetheless be excused if his disease of the mind has so 
far impaired his rationality that he has ceased to be a moral agent. . . .  Seen in this way, it 
is apparent why the excuse of legal insanity is fundamental.  No blaming system would be 
coherent if it imposed blame without regard to moral agency.  We may become angry with 
an object or an animal that thwarts us, but we can’t blame it.”) (footnote omitted); Levy, 
supra note 20, at 675 (“According to [Jeffrie] Murphy, while we must acknowledge the 
bad luck that lies behind every crime, we must still blame and punish the criminal for this 
crime because bad luck does not completely explain it.  When it does, the defendant is fully 
excused; too much bad luck is arguably what all the traditionally recognized criminal law 
excuses—insanity, infancy, hypnotism, involuntary intoxication, automatism, duress, 
necessity, mistake of fact, mistake of law, and entrapment—attempt to capture.”) (footnote 
omitted). 
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Into the first category, the Knowledge Constraint, fall 
mistake of fact and mistake of law.  Into the second category, 
the Volitional Constraint, falls automatism.  Into either category 
fall hypnotism, infancy, insanity, and involuntary intoxication.  
And into the third category, the Pressure Constraint, fall duress, 
necessity, and entrapment. 
V.  SITUATIONISM AND MORAL RESPONSIBILITY 
Given my monist account of the excuses, I now propose the 
following controversial claim:  If what it takes for a certain 
condition or circumstance to be an excuse is that it makes it 
unreasonable for society to expect better, law-abiding behavior 
from a given person, then there are several more conditions and 
circumstances that we should at least consider adding to the 
current list of excuses, conditions and circumstances that very 
arguably satisfy the Knowledge Constraint, the Volitional 
Constraint, or the Pressure Constraint.  The primary candidates 
are: 
• Battered Woman Syndrome 
• Postpartum depression 
• Indoctrination 
• Pedophilia 
• Cultural background 
• Past physical or sexual abuse 
• Situationism 
In this and the next Part, I will investigate the last of these 
candidates:  situationism.  I will argue that while there are some 
good reasons to think that situationism should be added to the 
list of recognized excuses, there are stronger reasons against this 
addition. 
A. Our Nearly Universal Capacity for Evil 
Consider the “Bloodlands”—the land between Germany 
and the Soviet Union in which Hitler and Stalin independently 
orchestrated the deaths of fourteen million innocent people.75  
We can offer several different explanations of how, for example, 
 
75.  See TIMOTHY SNYDER, BLOODLANDS: EUROPE BETWEEN HITLER AND STALIN 
vii-viii (2010). 
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an ordinary German citizen joined the Einsatzgruppen and 
zealously helped to round up Jewish villages in Poland after the 
German invasion in 1939, made them dig ditches, and then shot 
them (after beating them) into these ditches.76  While 
explanations such as anti-semitic propaganda, indoctrination, 
hatred, peer pressure, career advancement, and obedience to 
authority all help to provide some understanding, even the 
aggregate of these explanations still do not go the full distance.  
We still ask:  even given all of these motivations, how could 
they have done all this?  How could they enthusiastically beat, 
torture, and kill innocent men, women, and children?  Where 
was their compassion?  Prior to the Bloodlands, we might have 
thought that only psychopaths could have performed such acts.  
But the fact that the killing in the Bloodlands was conducted by 
many ordinary, non-psychopathic people easily undermines this 
thesis. 
One might argue that the Bloodlands was a unique event by 
a unique people in unique circumstances.77  People in most 
places at most times are incapable of doing what they did.  But 
there is plenty of historical data to refute this hypothesis—
especially genocides in other countries at other times (for 
example, Ukraine, Rwanda, Bosnia, and Darfur).78  And these 
 
76.  See DANIEL JONAH GOLDHAGEN, HITLER’S WILLING EXECUTIONERS: 
ORDINARY GERMANS AND THE HOLOCAUST 222-34 (1996). 
77.  See id. at 386, 389-92, 400-03, 408-09, 412-14 (inclining toward this thesis); 
Claudia E. Haupt, Regulating Hate Speech—Damned if You Do and Damned if You Don’t: 
Lessons Learned from Comparing the German and U.S. Approaches, 23 B.U. INT’L L.J. 
299, 302 (2005) (“Some argue that the Holocaust is such a singular occurrence that it 
cannot possibly be the subject of a comparative analysis.”); Gunnar Heinsohn, What Makes 
the Holocaust a Uniquely Unique Genocide?, 2 J. GENOCIDE RES. 411, 424-25 (2000) 
(arguing that the Holocaust was “uniquely unique”  because “it was a genocide for the 
purpose of reinstalling the right to genocide”) (footnote omitted); Alan C. Laifer, Note, 
Never Again? The “Concentration Camps” in Bosnia-Herzegovina: A Legal Analysis of 
Human Rights Abuses, 2 NEW EUR. L. REV. 159, 190-91 n.161 (1994) (“The Nazi 
Holocaust was unique . . . in the scope and number of murders and the fact that the 
liquidation of the targeted people was accomplished as a detriment to Germany’s very own 
central objective, which was to win World War II.  It was done to accomplish no strategic, 
political, or territorial gain.  On the contrary, Germany expended resources on mass murder 
it could have used to defeat its enemy, and it could have benefitted from the talents of some 
of the people it killed or exiled.”); Avishai Margalit & Gabriel Motzkin, The Uniqueness of 
the Holocaust, 25 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 65, 74-75 (1996) (“[I]t is exceedingly rare and maybe 
unique that a group of people has been both systematically humiliated and systematically 
killed.”). 
78.  See YEHUDA BAUER, RETHINKING THE HOLOCAUST 45-50 (2001); NORMAN G. 
FINKELSTEIN & RUTH BETTINA BIRN, A NATION ON TRIAL: THE GOLDHAGEN THESIS AND 
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are “just” genocides.  There are many more places where war 
crimes and crimes against humanity are routinely committed.  
Indeed, Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo are only some recent 
evidence that even ordinary Americans can do very bad things to 
other people.79  Slavery, the Trail of Tears, Japanese internment 
camps, and Hiroshima and Nagasaki provide that much more 
evidence that Americans are just as capable of cruelty as any 
other people.80 
Even with these examples in mind, however, most 
individuals still think that they themselves are incapable of 
cruelty.81  “I am different,” they think.  But in many if not most 
cases, this is nothing more than wishful thinking.  Despite our 
self-serving intuitions about our own virtue, there are several 
 
HISTORICAL TRUTH 80, 87-96, 88 n.78, 143-46 (1998) (critiquing the “Holocaust 
‘uniqueness’ mantra”); Ward Churchill, Defining the Unthinkable: Towards a Viable 
Understanding of Genocide, 2 OR. REV. INT’L L. 3, 26 (2000) (“Equally egregious have 
been the efforts of an uncomfortably large number of Jewish scholars to ‘prove’ that 
genocide is an historically unique fate suffered by their people alone at the hands of the 
[N]azis.”); Vivian Grosswald Curran, Deconstruction, Structuralism, Antisemitism and the 
Law, 36 B.C. L. REV. 1, 41-42 (1994) (“[T]he pervasive agreement among [H]olocaust 
scholars is that the [H]olocaust, whether or not unique up to the time of its occurrence, is 
not unique prospectively.”); Lawrence Douglas, Film as Witness: Screening Nazi 
Concentration Camps Before the Nuremberg Tribunal, 105 YALE L.J. 449, 475 (1995) 
(“While some scholars continue to emphasize the monstrous singularity of the Nazi 
genocide and question the motives of those who would challenge such an understanding, 
others have attempted to assimilate the extermination of the Jews into a more 
‘conventional’ history of atrocity, one that finds ample precedents in Stalin’s gulags and 
echoes in Pol Pot’s killing fields.”) (footnote omitted); Don B. Kates, Genocide, Self 
Defense, and the Right to Arms, 29 HAMLINE L. REV. 501, 507 (2006) (“In fact, Twentieth 
Century genocides killed over 260 million unarmed, defenseless victims.”); David Neiwert, 
Ash on the Sills: The Significance of the Patriot Movement in America, 58 MONT. L. REV. 
19, 24 n.9 (1997) (“The conditions [Daniel Goldhagen] describes—a combination of 
fascism and eliminationism—as bringing about the Holocaust . . . are probably replicable 
under other circumstances, particularly with a different target and a different palingenetic 
myth.”) (citation omitted). 
79.  See ZIMBARDO, supra note 3, at 324-79.  
80.  See FINKELSTEIN & BIRN, supra note 78, at 81-82 (arguing that Americans are 
selectively blind to their own cruel acts and policies); JONATHAN GLOVER, HUMANITY: A 
MORAL HISTORY OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 89-112 (1999) (discussing the events and 
mindset that led to the United States’ dropping atomic bombs on heavily populated cities in 
Japan). 
81.  See GINA PERRY, BEHIND THE SHOCK MACHINE: THE UNTOLD STORY OF THE 
NOTORIOUS MILGRAM PSYCHOLOGY EXPERIMENTS 295-96 (2012) (“It’s hard for anyone 
to imagine themselves as anything other than a defiant subject.  We just can’t imagine 
doing what they did. . . .  [Milgram’s research] was startling, counterintuitive, and it 
reinforced the notion that we might like to think we know ourselves but social 
psychologists know better:  inside all of us is a concentration-camp guard just waiting to be 
called into service.”).   
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compelling reasons to believe that very few of us are incapable 
of performing cruel acts.82  (In what follows, I assume the 
dictionary definition of cruelty:  callous indifference to or 
pleasure in causing pain and suffering.)83 
First, the Stanford Prison Experiment shows that ordinary, 
non-psychopathic people volunteering to participate in a 
psychological study willingly harmed others when the 
immediate norms surrounding them suddenly permitted.84  In the 
Stanford Prison Experiment, most of the Stanford students who 
had been randomly designated to serve as guards in a mock 
prison quickly resorted to overly harsh and sometimes cruel 
methods of maintaining control over the Stanford students who 
had been randomly designated to serve as prisoners.  Like the 
Milgram shock experiments, the Stanford Prison Experiment 
helped to show that when the norms are changed and ordinary 
people are suddenly authorized to treat strangers in ways that 
everyday life does not permit, these norms will often override 
their compassion.85 
Second, consider most people’s treatment of animals.  
Millions of people hunt, and billions eat meat.  Yet hunting is 
cruel because, whatever the person’s motivations—often 
tradition, family bonding, or just the thrill of the chase—it 
 
82.  See id. at 293 (“[W]hat about us . . . ?  Are we better than people who used to 
watch the Christians being thrown to the lions in ancient Rome?”); ZIMBARDO, supra note 
3, at vii (“I argue that while most people are good most of the time, they can be readily 
seduced into engaging in what would normally qualify as ego-alien deeds, as antisocial, as 
destructive of others.”); id. at 3, 5-6, 14-15 (insisting that virtually anybody can be induced 
to perform evil acts). 
83.  OXFORD’S AMERICAN DICTIONARY AND THESAURUS 337 (Oxford Press 2003). 
84.  See ZIMBARDO, supra note 3, at 23-257 (describing the Stanford Prison 
Experiment and its implications for human psychology). 
85.  See VIKTOR E. FRANKL, MAN’S SEARCH FOR MEANING: AN INTRODUCTION TO 
LOGOTHERAPY 48 (Ilse Lasch trans., 1959) (“No man should judge [people who favor their 
friends over others in life-and-death situations] unless he asks himself in absolute honesty 
whether in a similar situation he might not have done the same.”); JON MEACHAM, 
AMERICAN LION: ANDREW JACKSON IN THE WHITE HOUSE 359 (2008) (“[E]vil can appear 
perfectly normal to even the best men and women of a given time.”); STANLEY MILGRAM, 
OBEDIENCE TO AUTHORITY: AN EXPERIMENTAL VIEW 6 (1974) (“Sitting back in one’s 
armchair, it is easy to condemn the actions of the obedient subjects.  But those who 
condemn the subjects measure them against the standard of their own ability to formulate 
high-minded moral prescriptions.  That is hardly a fair standard.  Many of the subjects, at 
the level of stated opinion, feel quite as strongly as any of us about the moral requirement 
of refraining from action against a helpless victim.  They, too, in general terms know what 
ought to be done and can state their values when the occasion arises.  This has little, if 
anything, to do with their actual behavior under the pressure of circumstances.”). 
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involves an indifference to or pleasure in killing innocent, 
sentient, and intelligent beings.86  Likewise, eating meat is cruel 
because it involves an indifference to the plight of the animals 
killed for nothing more than a gratuitous and transitory pleasure 
in the consumption of their flesh.87  Eating meat is all the more 
 
86.  See George Anastaplo, September Eleventh, A Citizen's Responses [sic] 
(Continued Further), 35 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 625, 721 (2010); Gary L. Francione, 
Animals, Property and Legal Welfarism: “Unnecessary” Suffering and the “Humane” 
Treatment of Animals, 46 RUTGERS L. REV. 721, 723 (1994); Richard H. Hiers, Reverence 
for Life and Environmental Ethics in Biblical Law and Covenant, 13 J.L. & RELIGION 127, 
152-53 (1996-98); Laura J. Ireland, Canning Canned Hunts: Using State and Federal 
Legislation to Eliminate the Unethical Practice of Canned “Hunting,” 8 ANIMAL L. 223, 
236-37 (2002); Kenneth L. Karst, Religious Freedom and Equal Citizenship: Reflections 
on Lukumi, 69 TUL. L. REV. 335, 342 (1994); Elizabeth A. Moore, Note, “I'll Take Two 
Endangered Species, Please”: Is the Commercialization of Endangered Species a Valid 
Activity that Should Be Permitted Under the Endangered Species Act to Enhance the 
Survival of the Species?, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 627, 648 (2007); Dick Nelson, PETA 
Activists Aim to Reel in Sport Fishing, TIMES UNION (ALBANY, N.Y.), Feb. 11, 1996, at 
C10; George Reiger, Our Troubled Tradition: Could the Present Anti-Hunting Movement 
Date Back Not to Bambi But to the Manicured Suburban Lawn?, FIELD & STREAM 20 
(Feb. 1994); Bradford J. Roegge, Note, Survival of the Fittest: Hunters or Activists? First 
Amendment Challenges to Hunter Harassment Laws, 72 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 437, 437-
38, 441-42 (1995); Joyce Tischler, A Brief History of Animal Law, Part II (1985 - 2011), 5 
STAN. J. ANIMAL L. & POL'Y 27 (2012); Aileen Ugalde, Comment, The Right to Arm 
Bears: Activists' Protests Against Hunting, 45 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1109, 1113 (1991); Craig 
A. Wenner, Judicial Review and the Humane Treatment of Animals, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
1630, 1656 (2011); Bob Wyss, The Great Swamp: Through the Seasons Deer Hunters 
Want a Sporting Chance, PROVIDENCE JOURNAL-BULLETIN, Dec. 10, 1995, at 1A; 
Michael Levy, Students Divided Over the Pros and Cons of Hunting, BUFFALO NEWS, 
Dec. 21, 1993, at 2; Federal Report: ADC Petitions Flood Congress, HSUS NEWS 33 
(Spring, 1991); They Are Bloodthirsty Nuts, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Feb. 5, 1990, at 
35. 
87.  See Gary Chartier, The Law of Peoples or a Law for People: Consumers, 
Boycotts, and Non-Human Animals, 12 BUFF. ENVTL. L.J. 123, 159 (2005) (“[I]ndividual 
consumers who purchase meat from grocery stores or meat markets likely endorse their 
suppliers’ cooperation with slaughterhouses.  Customers who buy meat at restaurants are in 
a roughly comparable position. . . .  [T]hey likely do endorse the activities of the 
slaughterhouses and factory farms responsible for the availability of their meals and, thus, 
cooperate formally with the activities of these facilities.”); Pablo Lerner & Alfredo 
Mordechai Rabello, The Prohibition of Ritual Slaughtering (Kosher Shechita and Halal) 
and Freedom of Religion of Minorities, 22 J.L. & RELIGION 1, 51 (2007) (“Though you are 
so hard and cruel as to eat meat . . .”) (quoting A.I. Kook, Telalei Orot, in MAMARÈ 
HARAYAH 27 (Jerusalem 5744) (Hebrew)); Jay Sursukowski, The Hunt for Mercy, 3 J. 
ANIMAL L. 1, 10 (2007) (“Baroness Gale gave a speech which showed an unusual amount 
of commitment to individual animals when she revealed that not only did she not support 
hunting, but that she had also given up eating meat because of the cruelty to animals in 
factory farming and battery chicken operations.”); Paul Solotaroff, In the Belly of the 
Beast, ROLLING STONE, Dec. 10, 2013, available at http://www.rollingstone.com/feature/ 
belly-beast-meat-factory-farms-animal-activists (describing the rampant cruelty that is 
inflicted on factory-farm animals). 
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cruel when the individual knows about the brutality involved in 
hunting and livestock farming and still actively supports either 
industry by purchasing and eating the bloody results.  My point 
is not that human carnivores are committing or participating in 
genocide.  My point is that human carnivores are capable of 
committing or participating in genocide.  All we would need to 
do is convince them that certain groups of people are subhuman; 
dehumanization is one of the key steps necessary for mass 
violence.88  And the fact that millions hunt and billions eat meat 
shows that many, if not most, people are likely susceptible to 
this kind of persuasion. 
In case the reader doubts this point, what would she say if a 
person ate the flesh of human beings who had been raised and 
slaughtered on human farms?  She would most likely 
(hopefully) say that this behavior is cruel.  But then it is difficult 
to see why the same kind of behavior is not cruel to animals.  
And while many desperate attempts have been made by hunters 
and carnivores to elicit a morally relevant distinction between 
animals and humans,89 a distinction in virtue of which it is 
wrong/cruel to kill only the latter and not the former for food, 
these attempts merely prove the point:  human beings are very 
good at rationalizing cruelty.  Indeed, they are so good at 
rationalizing cruelty that they do not even realize when they are 
participating in it.  It is this facility for rationalization and denial 
that helps to explain why most human beings are also capable of 
great inhumanity.90 
Third, most human beings who insist that they simply could 
not deliberately hurt or kill another human being fail to realize 
that there is at least one situation in which they would make a 
big exception to this “rule” without much, if any, hesitation or 
 
88.  See MILGRAM, supra note 85, at 9 (“For a decade and more, vehement anti-
Jewish propaganda systematically prepared the German population to accept the 
destruction of the Jews. . . .  Systematic devaluation of the victim provides a measure of 
psychological justification for brutal treatment of the victim and has been the constant 
accompaniment of massacres, pogroms, and wars.”); ZIMBARDO, supra note 3, at xii 
(“Dehumanization is one of the central processes in the transformation of ordinary, normal 
people into indifferent or even wanton perpetrators of evil. . . .   It makes some people 
come to see those others as enemies deserving of torment, torture, and annihilation.”); id. at 
308-10 (explaining how dehumanization promotes violence). 
89.  See Ken Levy, The Carnivore’s Challenge (unpublished manuscript) (on file 
with author). 
90.  See id.  
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compunction:  righteous vengeance.91  All it takes to infuriate 
most people to the point of violent rage or at least enthusiastic 
approval of violence is to threaten, harm, or kill their loved ones.  
In this way, righteous vengeance easily contradicts people’s 
intuitions that they themselves are simply incapable of great 
schadenfreude.92 
I conclude that most human beings are capable of 
participating in genocide.  In case the reader is still skeptical of 
this proposition, or at least of the proposition that she is so 
capable, she needs to answer three questions:  (a) Does she 
ordinarily comply with social norms accompanied by social 
pressure?; (b) Does she knowingly consume any animal 
products?; and (c) Would she want a person who deliberately 
and seriously harmed or killed her loved ones to suffer or die?  
If the answer to any one of these three questions is yes, then she 
is very arguably capable of violence/cruelty or at least willful 
toleration of violence/cruelty.  And however she justifies her 
affirmative answers, genocides are generally committed by 
people who are convinced that they are in the right.93 
B. The Dispositionism Paradox 
The previous section was not designed to convince the 
reader that she is evil.  It is designed to show that she is most 
likely capable of evil, at least of violence or cruelty, and very 
skillful at both rationalizing and denying this capacity.  But 
there is something that the previous section left out.  While it 
may have provided some understanding of why people beat, 
rape, torture, and kill masses of innocent human beings, it still—
arguably—failed to fully explain how ordinarily compassionate 
individuals can commit these violent acts.  So the question 
remains:  just how do ordinarily compassionate people do these 
things?  How does their conscience not get the better of them? 
Perhaps the most common answer to these questions is that 
the people who commit violent acts are violent people.94  On this 
 
91.  See Levy, supra note 20, at 651. 
92.  See supra notes 25 and 47 and accompanying text. 
93.  See supra notes 68 and 69 and accompanying text. 
94.  See Donald A. Dripps, Fundamental Retribution Error: Criminal Justice and the 
Social Psychology of Blame, 56 VAND. L. REV. 1383, 1388 (2003) (describing 
psychological research indicating a tendency to “attribute the behavior of others to 
personality rather than context”). 
2015] DOES SITUATIONISM EXCUSE? 811	
view, each violent act is perpetrated by a violent individual; 
therefore mass violence is perpetrated by large groups of violent 
individuals.  One label for this theory is “dispositionism.”95  
Dispositionism is another term for personality psychology.  It 
locates the explanation for a given action entirely in the agent or 
the agent’s personality.96  Dispositionism therefore lends itself 
to the assumption of individual responsibility and corresponding 
assignments of blame.  If the reason that the individual 
committed wrongdoing resides entirely within the individual, 
then it seems to follow that the individual alone is responsible—
blameworthy—for her wrongdoing.  When we view human 
action from a dispositionist framework, we tend to make the 
(rebuttable) presumption that most actions are freely chosen and 
therefore, if wrongful, perfectly blameworthy and punishable.97 
Unfortunately, there is a significant problem with the 
dispositionist explanation of mass atrocities.  Call it the 
“Dispositionism Paradox.”  On the one hand, most people do not 
commit violent crimes.  On the other hand, we have seen whole 
societies engage in the most inhumane, cruel acts toward 
others—widescale persecution, torture, rape, murder, and 
genocide.  These two points are in serious tension with each 
other.  Yet both seem indisputably true.  How, then, do we 
reconcile them? 
We cannot resolve the Dispositionism Paradox by adopting 
the assumption that all of the people who engage in mass 
atrocities were already violent criminals just waiting for the 
opportunity to unleash themselves.  This assumption is weak for 
two reasons.  First, it lacks explanatory power.  It amounts to the 
circular explanation that some people commit violent acts 
because they have a violent nature.  And how do we know that 
they have a violent nature?  Because they commit violent acts.  
Their behavior is used as evidence of their character, and their 
character is then used to explain this behavior.  So all the 
explanation amounts to is:  they commit violent acts because 
they commit violent acts.  Second, this assumption is ad hoc, 
 
95.  See ZIMBARDO, supra note 3, at 7; Peter A. Alces, Guerilla Terms, 56 EMORY 
L.J. 1511, 1548-49 (2007); Benforado et al., supra note 3, at 1657-58; Dripps, supra note 
94; Amy L. Wax, supra note 3, at 1387.  
96.  Benforado et al., supra note 3. 
97.  See, e.g., GOLDHAGEN, supra note 76, at 379, 383, 389-92, 400 (defending the 
dispositionist thesis that the Holocaust was ultimately motivated by Germans’ 
“eliminationist anti-semitism”). 
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inconsistent with the evidence, and therefore implausible.  
Again, most people at most times are not violent. 
C. Situationism and Norm-Compliance 
Given both of these problems with the dispositionist 
explanation of mass atrocities, we need to consider another 
explanation.  This is where situationism comes in.  Situationism 
is a psychological theory that is designed to explain what 
dispositionism cannot.  It says that people do bad things not 
because they are, and always were, bad but because they became 
bad. 
Situationism, which is another term for social psychology, 
agrees with dispositionism that the agent’s nature helps to 
explain her action.  This point is obvious; it would be foolish to 
reject it.  But situationism says that this point, while true, must 
be seriously qualified.  The agent’s nature does not constitute 
the whole explanation and sometimes may not even constitute 
most of the explanation.  In order to understand why the agent 
did what she did, we must understand not only the agent but also 
to an equal or even greater extent her situation, her external 
circumstances.98 
When an agent finds herself in a situation that either 
elevates her power to a level that is without ordinary (previous) 
moral constraints or causes the agent abnormally high stress, 
pressure to conform or obey, fear, anger, or exhaustion, her 
typically expressed character and personality traits tend to play a 
lesser role in the explanation of her behavior.  They are 
superseded by the circumstances, circumstances that trigger an 
“uncharacteristic” response, a response that is either contrary to, 
or independent of, her character under normal circumstances.  
Put another way, the agent’s motivational system undergoes a 
shift.  While her distinctive personality and character generally 
dominated before, a more submerged, animal, instinctive, and 
autonomous part of her psychological framework, a part that she 
shares with all other human beings, now takes over.  And the 
longer circumstances motivate her to continue acting in this 
way, the more this behavior will incorporate itself into the 
agent’s personality and thereby work to reshape her beliefs, 
values, reasons, and future actions.  Situationism, then, helps to 
 
98.  See supra note 3. 
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explain how, throughout history, so many initially decent, 
upright, law-abiding people have turned into agents of the worst 
possible atrocities.99 
The fundamental mechanism of situationism is norm-
compliance.  How we act most or all of the time in most or all 
social and public situations is determined mostly by the norms 
that apply to those situations and our internalization of these 
norms.100  If we find ourselves in a situation that tolerates or 
 
99.  In contrast to Goldhagen, many, if not most, accounts of the Holocaust (and 
other genocides) are situationist.  See, e.g., FINKELSTEIN & BIRN, supra note 78, at 98 
(“‘We must remember,’ Auschwitz survivor Primo Levi wrote, that ‘the diligent executors 
of inhuman orders were not born torturers, were not (with a few exceptions) monsters:  
they were ordinary men.’  Not deranged perverts but ‘perfectly normal men,’ ‘ordinary 
men’:  that is the really sensational truth about the perpetrators of the Final Solution.”); id. 
at 100 (“[T]he central mystery of the Nazi [H]olocaust [is] how, under particular historical 
circumstances, ordinary men and women, as well as the ‘civilized gentlemen’ who lead 
nations, can commit history’s greatest crimes.”); id. at 144 (“[Daniel] Goldhagen’s concept 
of ‘natural’ human behavior is striking. . . .  Goldhagen ignores the . . . evident human 
potential for evil and destructiveness. . . .  Hence he must attack any concepts that involve 
the allegedly ‘‘universal’ psychological and social psychological factors.’  And in fact, he 
dismisses them as ‘abstract, ahistorical explanations . . . conceived in a social-
psychological laboratory.’  Milgram’s experiments on cruelty and obedience to authority 
are brushed aside as providing ‘untenable’ explanations.’”) (citations omitted); ZIMBARDO, 
supra note 3, at 287-88 (“Although it is important to note the motivating role of Germans’ 
hatred of Jews [as a cause of the Holocaust], Goldhagen’s analysis suffers from two flaws.  
First, historical evidence shows that from the early nineteenth century on there was less 
anti-Semitism in Germany than in neighboring countries such as France and Poland.  He 
also errs in minimizing the influence of Hitler’s authority system—a network that glorified 
racial fanaticism and the particular situations created by the authorities, like the 
concentration camps, which mechanized genocide.  It was the interaction of personal 
variables of German citizens with situational opportunities provided by a System of 
fanatical prejudice that combined to empower so many to become willing or unwilling 
executioners for their state.”). 
100.  See, e.g., Lynne L. Dallas, A Preliminary Inquiry Into the Responsibility of 
Corporations and Their Officers and Directors for Corporate Climate: The Psychology of 
Enron’s Demise, 35 RUTGERS L.J. 1, 21-22 (2003) (“Employees either internalize the 
primary group’s definition of unethical behavior through a socialization process, or adopt it 
through peer pressure, and act on that basis.”); Susan Hanley Duncan, MySpace is also 
Their Space: Ideas for Keeping Children Safe from Sexual Predators on Social-Networking 
Sites, 96 KY. L.J. 527, 571-72 (2007-08) (“Moral beliefs and social norms, either alone or 
in conjunction with legal sanctions, deter a number of undesired behaviors including sexual 
assault, assault, academic dishonesty and drunk driving.  Social-norms theory contemplates 
that humans generally conform to how the majority behaves. . . .  [I]nformal social norms 
influence[] people within tight-knit groups because the benefits of cooperating with others 
in the group produce[] positive results for individuals.  In addition, individuals that 
cooperate[] could avoid shame or social sanctions from the group.”) (footnotes omitted); 
Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science:  Removing the 
Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051, 1130-31 (2000) 
(“[E]xisting norms may be a contextual factor that affects individuals' construction of 
preferences . . .  In many cases, a social norm might derive its power from both the desire 
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encourages festive behavior—for example, college parties, 
football stadiums, or wedding celebrations—most of us will act 
festively.  And if we find ourselves in a situation that encourages 
serious behavior—for example, religious services, classrooms, 
funerals, and faculty meetings—most of us will act seriously.  
We are social and political animals.  We take our cues from 
other people and generally follow the written and unwritten 
rules appropriate to the human-created setting.  What others 
generally do and approve of is okay, and what others generally 
do not do or approve of is not okay.101  Just compare the 
percentage of people in the United States who believe that 
women should have suffrage and the right to work outside the 
home with the percentage of people who held these beliefs one 
hundred years ago.102 
What then, happens, when the norms flip—that is, when 
they tolerate or encourage behavior that was previously 
forbidden?  We need not speculate.  History and psychological 
studies show that most human beings quickly adapt to, and 
internalize, the new norms.103  Why?  Because most people just 
want to get along; they want to survive, be liked, achieve, and 
accumulate rewards (e.g., money, sex, power, accolades, and 
 
for social approval and from internalization.”) (footnotes omitted); Cherie Metcalf, 
Property Law Culture: Public Law, Private Preferences and the Psychology of 
Expropriation, 39 QUEEN'S L.J. 685, 689-90 (2014); David G. Post, Of Black Holes and 
Decentralized Law-Making in Cyberspace, 2 VAND. J. ENT. L. & PRAC. 70, 71 (2000); 
Rachlinski, Limits, supra note 3, at 1564 (“The idea that group norms are powerful and 
important determinants of behavior pervades the social psychological literature. . . . 
Clearly, even though they are sometimes inconsistent with each other, social norms are a 
powerful influence on social behavior.  Hence, understanding social norms is a key to 
understanding social behavior.”); Jessica E. Schaffner, Optimal Deterrence: A Law and 
Economics Assessment of Sex and Labor Trafficking Law in the United States, 51 HOUS. L. 
REV. 1519, 1544-45 (2014). 
101.  See Russell D. Clark III & Larry E. Word, Why Don’t Bystanders Help? 
Because of Ambiguity?, 24 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 392, 393 (1972) (arguing 
that bystanders’ judgments about a situation depend largely on how other bystanders react); 
Ken Levy, Killing, Letting Die, and the Case for Mildly Punishing Bad Samaritanism, 44 
GA. L. REV. 607, 674 (2010) (“When they are in a group, people tend to exhibit the 
‘bystander effect’—i.e., tend to be more reticent about directly addressing the emergency. . 
. .  [One reason for this phenomenon is that] each person in the group infers from the 
others’ inaction that there is not really an emergency in the first place—i.e., that the person 
in distress is merely pretending or exaggerating.”) (footnotes omitted). 
102.  See Sandra Day O’Connor, The History of the Women’s Suffrage Movement, 49 
VAND. L. REV. 657, 657-58 (1996) (offering an historical account of the women’s suffrage 
movement in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries). 
103.  See supra note 100 and accompanying text. 
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fame).104  But all of this getting along requires a flexible 
morality—that is, a morality that adjusts itself to the dominant 
morality even if the dominant morality suddenly changes.  
Indeed, this flexibility explains why one and the same person 
can lead “double” or even “triple” lives—that is, act one way 
with his family, another way at work, and still another way with 
his mistress.  It also explains how mass atrocities are possible.  
With the help of propaganda, peer pressure, terror, and ambition, 
people consciously or unconsciously break from their previous 
morality to carry out acts that the “new morality” encourages or 
requires.105 
D. Stanley Milgram’s Shock Experiment 
Should situationism be added to the list of recognized 
criminal excuses?  In this section, I will offer the best case I can 
for an affirmative answer.  In the next Part, however, I will offer 
 
104.  See Carl E. Schneider & Mark A. Hall, The Patient Life: Can Consumers Direct 
Health Care?, 35 AM. J.L. & MED. 7, 50 (2009) (“What people most fundamentally want is 
not so much ‘control’ as doing the things that are important to them – working at rewarding 
jobs with congenial colleagues, spending time with the people they love and like, enjoying 
their leisure, and so on.”); Roy D. Simon, Legal Ethics Advisors and the Interests of 
Justice: Is an Ethics Advisor a Conscience or a Co-Conspirator?, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 
1869, 1871 (2002) (“Human nature sometimes prefers affirmation over accuracy.”); 
Lynelle J. Slivinski, Note, Copyright Infringement—In Determining Whether or Not a 
Copyright License Is Exclusive or Nonexclusive, Courts Should Look Beyond the Parties' 
Original Agreement and Consider Their Subsequent Actions: Jacob Maxwell, Inc. v. 
Veeck, 110 F.3d 749 (11th Cir. 1997), 8 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 719 (1998) (“It is a fact 
of human nature to want recognition for that which we achieve and develop.  Other 
people's mere personal satisfaction in your work would not be worth much if the users or 
admirers have no idea who is responsible for the creation.”). 
105.  See GLOVER, supra note 80, at 360 (“The belief system was central to Nazism.  
The pressures to obey were internalized because the beliefs were accepted.  The beliefs 
motivated the repression of human responses and the erosion of people’s previous moral 
identity.  A new moral identity grew round acceptance of Nazi beliefs.”); id. at 362 
(“People want their lives to add up to something, to contribute to something larger than 
themselves.  Many Germans found Nazism gave their lives a meaning and a purpose.  
Glory came from participating in the project of national renewal, in helping to build the 
Thousand-Year-Reich.  The beliefs were held with great intensity and sustained some 
Nazis through running the death camps and the resulting trials.”); see also Drucilla Cornell, 
Sexual Difference, the Feminine, and Equivalency: A Critique of MacKinnon’s Toward A 
Feminist Theory of the State, 100 YALE L.J. 2247, 2273 (1991) (book review) (“I in no 
way want to deny that fear too often leads to cruelty.  We see this in race relations as well 
as in relations between the sexes.”); Gregory M. Herek, Beyond “Homophobia”: Thinking 
About Sexual Prejudice and Stigma in the Twenty-First Century, 1 SEXUALITY RES. & 
SOC. POL’Y 6, 7 (2004) (citing George Weinberg’s statement that fear always leads to 
“great brutality”). 
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several compelling reasons to reject this position.  The best 
possible argument for adding situationism to the list of 
recognized excuses is simply this:  situationism negates moral 
responsibility, and criminal responsibility requires moral 
responsibility.  Therefore situationism is exculpatory. 
Consider Stanley Milgram’s shock experiments, which are 
often cited as virtually dispositive evidence for situationism.106  
In the Milgram shock experiments,107 volunteers were solicited 
in New Haven, Connecticut with the promise of $4.50 for 
participating in a psychology experiment.  When a given 
volunteer (“Volunteer”) arrived, he or she was introduced to 
another person who was designated as a fellow volunteer but 
was really a research assistant.  Volunteer was then told that that 
she and her (supposed) fellow volunteer (“Fellow”) were 
participating in a study to determine whether punishment in the 
form of shock treatment would help to improve memory and 
learning.  After Fellow was directed to a chair, strapped in, and 
surrounded with wires and electrodes, Volunteer was led to an 
adjacent room; presented with a device that, she was told, would 
enable her to administer shocks of increasing intensity to 
 
106.  See MILGRAM, supra note 85, at 5-6 (“A commonly offered explanation [for 
the results of Milgram’s shock experiments] is that those who shocked the victim at the 
most severe level were monsters, the sadistic fringe of society.  But if one considers that 
almost two-thirds of the participants fall into the category of ‘obedient’ subjects, and that 
they represented ordinary people drawn from working, managerial, and professional 
classes, the argument becomes very shaky. . . .  After witnessing hundreds of ordinary 
people submit to the authority in our experiments, I must conclude that [Hannah] Arendt’s 
conception of the banality of evil comes closer to the truth than one might dare imagine.  
The ordinary person who shocked the victim did so out of a sense of obligation—a 
conception of his duties as a subject—and not from any peculiarly aggressive 
tendencies.”); id. at 175 (“The occasion we term a psychological experiment shares its 
essential structural properties with other situations composed of subordinate and 
superordinate roles.  In all such circumstances the person responds not so much to the 
content of what is required but on the basis of his relationship to the person who requires it.  
Indeed, where legitimate authority is the source of action, relationship overwhelms content.  
That is what is meant by the importance of social structure . . . .”); ZIMBARDO, supra note 
3, at 272 (“The data [of the Milgram shock experiments] clearly revealed the extreme 
pliability of human nature:  almost everyone could be totally obedient or almost everyone 
could resist authority pressures.  It all depended on the situational variables they 
experienced.”).  But see PERRY, supra note 81, at 60-62, 127-41, 147-51, 213, 297 
(questioning both the authenticity of Milgram’s data and Milgram’s situationist 
interpretation of this data); id. at 169, 225-26 (pointing out that Milgram himself 
sometimes interpreted the results of his shock experiments from a dispositionist rather than 
situationist perspective). 
107.  I base the following description of the shock experiments on MILGRAM, supra 
note 85, at 3-4, 13-122, and PERRY, supra note 81, at 7-9, 39-64, 95-124. 
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Fellow; and instructed to administer a shock initially of low-
level intensity for the first error made by Fellow, a shock of 
slightly higher intensity for Fellow’s second error, and so on. 
Many trials (with different variations) were conducted with 
different volunteers.  All of them administered increasing shocks 
to a point where Fellow was screaming with pain and 
demanding to be released from the chair.  All of them continued 
to look for guidance from the research instructor—call him 
“Instructor”—who was wearing a white labcoat, holding a 
clipboard, and insisting very calmly but firmly that Volunteer 
must continue with the experiment.  And the vast majority of 
them—65%—continued until they could no longer hear Fellow 
screaming, which led many in this majority group to believe that 
their shocks had actually killed Fellow. 
In the actual experiment, Fellow did not die.  Nor was he 
actually shocked.  Again, he was not actually a fellow volunteer 
but a research assistant who screamed not because he was 
suffering any pain but merely to fool Volunteer into thinking 
that he was.  Milgram and his research assistants were testing 
not learning techniques but rather people’s willingness to obey 
authority. 
E. Arguments for Recognizing Situationism as a Moral 
Excuse 
Hypothetically, suppose that Fellow was actually a fellow 
volunteer, was actually shocked, did scream from actual pain 
and terror, and was actually killed by Volunteer’s incrementally 
increasing shocks.  Suppose, further, that Volunteer was 
promptly indicted by the local district attorney for manslaughter 
or negligent homicide.108 
Volunteer’s initial conversation with her defense 
attorney—“Attorney”—would probably go something like this: 
Volunteer:  I did not kill Fellow.  Instructor did. 
Attorney:  It doesn’t matter.  Both of you killed Fellow.  So 
the D.A. can argue that both of you served as accomplices.  
 
108.  The D.A. could not charge Volunteer with murder because Volunteer did not 
have intent or knowledge.  It is obvious that Volunteer did not intend to kill Fellow.  
Regarding knowledge, there is insufficient evidence that Volunteer knew that she was 
killing Fellow with each consecutive shock.  On the contrary, she was very surprised to 
learn after the experiment that she had actually killed Fellow. 
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Moreover, you were arguably more blameworthy for 
Fellow’s death than Instructor because you, not Instructor, 
administered the shocks. 
Volunteer:  But Instructor should be charged with murder.  
Unlike me, he either wanted Fellow to die or knew that 
Fellow would die. 
Attorney:  Possibly.  Don’t worry about Instructor.  
Whether or not he goes away for murder, you will still be 
tried for manslaughter or negligent homicide. 
Volunteer:  But Instructor, the one who committed murder, 
coerced me into administering the shocks. 
Attorney:  Did Instructor ever threaten you? 
Volunteer:  Yes—implicitly.  He made me worry that if I 
did not complete the experiment, he—a prominent Yale 
expert—would be very disappointed with me.  I was also 
worried that they would not pay me.  And I really needed 
the money. 
Attorney:  Those are not very threatening consequences.  In 
any event, I know that they told you up front that you 
would be paid even if you did not complete the experiment. 
Volunteer:  None of this makes sense.  I trusted him.  I 
thought he knew what he was doing.109 
Attorney thinks about Volunteer’s last comment for a few 
minutes and then comes up with Volunteer’s defense: 
situationism.  According to this defense, Volunteer is not 
criminally responsible for manslaughter because (a) situationist 
pressures negated her moral responsibility, and (b) moral 
responsibility is necessary for criminal responsibility.  Because 
(b) is generally assumed without argument, and because I will 
refute (b) in Part VI, I will concentrate for the remainder of this 
section on (a). 
How might Attorney argue that situationist pressures 
negated Volunteer’s moral responsibility?  Recall the four 
conditions of moral responsibility: 
 
109.  See PERRY, supra note 81, at 60-62 (offering evidence that subjects in 
Milgram’s shock experiments continued to apply increasingly intense shocks to fellow 
subjects (the “learners”) not because they were indifferent but rather because they trusted 
the authoritative lab instructor’s assertions that the learners were not in any danger of 
suffering serious harm). 
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(1) knowledge, or a threshold capacity to know, that a 
given action “A” is morally wrong; 
(2) a threshold capacity to refrain from A-ing; 
(3) threshold control over A-ing; and 
(4) an absence of circumstances that excuse this 
performance. 
Given these four conditions, Attorney could employ three 
arguments to establish that Volunteer was not morally 
responsible for causing Fellow’s death. 
First, Volunteer—like most other people—was simply too 
weak to withstand the situationist pressures to which she was 
subjected.  And to say that she was too weak is just to say that, 
given her constitution, she could not have mustered the strength 
and courage to resist Instructor’s commands—no more than 
most of us can sit still at a green light and withstand the pressure 
of angry drivers honking their horns behind us.  We are 
hardwired to succumb to even the mildest social pressure.  
Therefore condition (2) is not satisfied, in which case Volunteer 
is not morally responsible for her behavior.110 
Second, even if Volunteer could have withstood the 
situationist pressures that confronted her, it is understandable 
that she did not.  The majority of other human beings do not—
and would not—resist these pressures either.  While it seems fair 
to blame an individual for violating a norm, it seems much less 
fair to blame her for complying with a norm.  “Industry 
 
110.  This argument assumes that the ability to do otherwise—what is usually called 
“free will”—is necessary for moral responsibility.  See NELKIN, supra note 27, at 3 (“[T]he 
notion of responsibility at issue has been at the heart of debates over whether we have free 
will, where it is very often (although not always) presupposed that free will is essential to 
responsibility in the sense required for deserved praise and blame.”); Luis E. Chiesa, 
Punishing Without Free Will, 2011 UTAH L. REV. 1403, 1421 (2011) (“Free will is relevant 
to criminal liability because blame is typically a prerequisite for the imposition of 
punishment.  It is generally believed that an actor can be blamed for committing an offense 
only if he freely willed to engage in conduct constitutive of the offense.”); Randolph 
Clarke, Free Will and the Conditions of Moral Responsibility, 66 PHIL. STUD. 53, 55 
(1992) (“[F]ree will is a necessary condition of being morally responsible for what one 
does.”); Levy, supra note 5, at 1331 (“Of course, one might respond that, given that control 
does not entail the power to do otherwise, only control . . . not the power to do otherwise . . 
. is necessary for moral responsibility.  This point may have merit, but—to be on the safe 
(or traditional) side—I will simply continue to assume that [the power to do otherwise] is 
also necessary for moral responsibility.”); R. George Wright, Criminal Law And 
Sentencing: What Goes With Free Will?, 5 DREXEL L. REV. 1, 10-11 (2012) (“It is often 
argued that there can be no genuine moral responsibility without freedom of will . . . .”). 
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standards”—the dominant norms governing a certain kind of 
situation—tend to excuse.111  Therefore condition (4) is not 
satisfied, in which case Volunteer is (once again) not morally 
responsible for her behavior. 
According to this second argument, situationism is not 
necessarily about hard choice.  If Volunteer felt little or no inner 
conflict—if, for example, she willingly obeyed Instructor 
because she trusted him—situationism would still qualify as a 
compelling excuse.  What makes it exculpatory is not so much 
any hard choice that it forced upon Volunteer but rather, again, 
its being the norm.  Volunteer could very plausibly argue that 
the specific conditions of the situation led most people—again, 
65%—to trust and obey.  Perhaps that is not a good thing; 
perhaps it is something to be lamented.  But lamentable or not, 
this is what human beings generally do.  And we certainly 
cannot punish Volunteer for being an ordinary human being. 
Third, it might be proposed that it makes more sense to 
discuss situationism as a version of duress than as a different 
kind of excuse altogether and therefore that we already do 
recognize situationism as an excuse.112  We just do not label it as 
such.  Duress, according to the Model Penal Code, is “an 
affirmative defense that the actor engaged in the conduct 
charged to constitute an offense because he was coerced to do so 
by the use of, or a threat to use, unlawful force against his 
person or the person of another, which a person of reasonable 
firmness in his situation would have been unable to resist.”113  
Situationism differs from duress only insofar as it involves great 
social pressure and therefore the threat of rejection and 
condemnation rather than coercion “by the use of, or a threat to 
use, unlawful force.”114 
 
111.  See 1 DAVID G. OWEN & MARY J. DAVIS, OWEN & DAVIS ON PRODUCTS 
LIABILITY § 7:6 (4th ed. 2014) (“Where industry or governmental standards pertain to 
testing obligations, conformity with those standards is probative of due care.  So, for 
example, in the HIV antibody blood bank screening case of Zaccone v. American Red 
Cross . . . the federal trial court held, compliance with professional standards represented 
not just a rebuttable presumption of due care in testing, but conclusive proof of due care.”) 
(footnote omitted); Michael J. Weber & Cynthia A. Mellon, ATMs and Check Fraud: 
Who’s Watching the Store?, 9 FIDELITY L.J. 1, 8 (2003) (“The industry standard may be 
considered as evidence of compliance with ordinary care . . . .”). 
112.  See CHARLES EISENSTEIN, THE MORE BEAUTIFUL WORLD OUR HEARTS 
KNOW IS POSSIBLE 166 (2013). 
113.  MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09(1) (2014). 
114.  Id. 
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Of course, the kind of “penalty” that Instructor in the 
Milgram experiment implicitly threatened Volunteer with—
namely, nonpayment of $4.50 and probable expressions of 
disappointment—was not at all sufficient to excuse homicide, at 
least not from a third-person perspective.  But one might argue 
that the situationism defense should be considered instead from 
a first-person perspective—that is, from Volunteer’s perspective 
rather than from your or my perspective.  On this version of 
duress, merely to feel compelled is to be compelled.  In this 
particular kind of situation, the belief creates the reality.  If one 
believes that she is not free, then she is not free.  Belief in free 
will is a necessary condition of free will; without this belief, free 
will evaporates.  Merely by believing that one has no choice, 
one is thereby left without a choice.115 
So even if Volunteer’s acquiescence to Instructor’s 
commands was unreasonable from a third-person point of view, 
it was not necessarily unreasonable from Volunteer’s own first-
person point of view.  The fact that Volunteer acted in the same 
way that many others—indeed, 65%—also acted in the same 
situation confirms this point.  It is much more plausible to think 
that most or all of this 65% thought that they were acting 
reasonably—or at least that they reasonably believed that they 
could not have resisted—than that they were knowingly acting 
unreasonably. 
In this way, situationism is much like what Doug Husak 
calls the “but-everyone-does-that!” (“BEDT”) defense.116  
According to the BEDT defense, a defendant should be blamed 
and punished less than normal because her behavior did not fall 
below the commonly accepted norm.117  This defense may sound 
like duress, but the two differ in their motivations.  While duress 
involves fear-motivated compliance with a threat, BEDT 
involves fully voluntary compliance with a norm.118  
Situationism falls closer to the latter insofar as it is not 
 
115.  See GALEN STRAWSON, FREEDOM AND BELIEF 13-15, 72-73, 293-305 (1986) 
(defending the “Subjectivist” claim that “believing one is a free agent is a necessary and 
indeed constitutive condition of actually being a free agent”); Tomis Kapitan, Doxastic 
Freedom: A Compatibilist Alternative, 26 AMER. PHIL. Q. 31 (1989) (arguing that 
“doxastic freedom”—a belief that one has free will—is necessary for free will). 
116.  Douglas Husak, The ‘But-Everyone-Does-That!’ Defense, 10 PUB. AFF. Q. 307 
(1996). 
117.  Id. at 307-08. 
118.  Id. at 312. 
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necessarily, or usually, motivated by fear so much as by an 
unconscious tendency to “blend in” or conform. 
VI.  SITUATIONISM AND CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY 
In Part V.E, I offered three arguments that a person subject 
to strong situationist pressures is not morally responsible for her 
behavior.  In this Part, however, I will argue that even if those 
arguments are correct, she is still criminally responsible.  So one 
of the central points of this article—that criminal responsibility 
does not require moral responsibility—follows.  Once again, as I 
argued in Part III, the four conditions of criminal responsibility 
are: 
(5) knowledge, or a threshold capacity to know, the 
(relevant) criminal law (C); 
(6) a threshold capacity to refrain from violating C; 
(7) threshold control over violating C; and 
(8) an absence of circumstances that excuse this violation. 
Regarding condition (5), we may simply assume that 
Volunteer knows that it is against the law to commit battery, no 
less to kill others.  Regarding condition (7), Volunteer had 
control over the escalating shocks.  She administered them.  The 
shocks were not administered through her.  The doctor did not 
force her hand to keep moving the switch.  Volunteer did this all 
on her own.  The fact that she administered them because a 
doctor commanded her at best negates her capacity to refrain, 
not her control—a distinction that I made clear in Part III. 
But what about condition (8)?  Does situationism qualify as 
a good excuse?  In Part V.E, we came across three strong 
arguments that it does.  Once again, (a) situationism negates 
condition (2) (the ability to do otherwise); (b) even if 
situationism did not negate condition (2), we cannot reasonably 
expect a person to refrain from complying with the operative 
norms; and (c) situationism is very similar to duress.  All of 
these arguments help to show that situationism negates moral 
responsibility.  Still, I will now offer three arguments that 
situationism does not negate criminal responsibility. 
First, there are serious dangers, both political and practical, 
involved in recognizing situationism as a legitimate excuse.  It is 
dangerous because it would threaten to absolve many criminals, 
including perpetrators of the most horrific domestic and 
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international crimes.  One can only imagine the public outrage if 
a criminal court were to excuse a terrorist who helped to kill 
innocent civilians on the grounds that she only did what many 
other people in her specific situation with her specific history 
have done or would have done.  This kind of excuse could not 
be recognized more than once or twice without seriously 
undermining the public’s respect for the law and the criminal 
justice system generally.119 
Second, if we were to recognize situationism as an excuse, 
we would be shortchanging our retributive impulses.  We would 
be increasingly depriving victims and society generally of the 
retribution that they want—and deserve—against the criminals 
who harm and threaten them.120  Not only would this state of 
affairs itself be unfair—too forgiving to perpetrators and too 
insensitive to victims.  It would also do great damage to our 
criminal justice system.  One of the very valuable “services” that 
the criminal justice system provides to victims and to society 
generally is “getting even” with criminals, “paying them back” 
for defying society’s moral norms and callously inflicting harm 
on people who did not deserve it.121  Were the criminal justice 
system to cut back on this “service” by recognizing situationism 
as an excuse and thereby acquitting defendants like Volunteer, 
whom we intuitively consider blameworthy, it would be sending 
the highly offensive message that the costs of condemning some 
criminals’ blind compliance with operative norms are greater 
than the costs of their compliance itself.  This would not be 
justice; it would be the height of injustice. 
 
119.  See Robinson, supra note 4, at 62 (“The law can build its moral credibility by 
distributing punishment in a way that tracks shared intuitions of justice of the community it 
governs—what has been called ‘empirical desert.’”); id. at 65 (“[T]he criminal law’s moral 
credibility is essential to effective crime control, and is enhanced if the distribution of 
criminal liability is perceived as ‘doing justice’—that is, if it assigns liability and 
punishment in ways that the community perceives as consistent with its shared intuitions of 
justice.”). 
120.  See supra notes 25, 47, and 92 and accompanying text. 
121.  See Levy, supra note 20, at 661-62 (“[T]he state is acting in place of the victim.  
It is helping the victim to do what she would ordinarily be powerless to do on her own.  It 
is, in this sense, the victim’s avenging agent, working on her behalf to make sure that the 
person who victimized her gets the punishment that he deserves for victimizing her.  By 
assuming victims’ burden of punishing the criminals who harm them, the state 
demonstrates that it shares and affirms the victim’s motivations, that it also wants revenge 
for violations against its ‘client.’”). 
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Third, situationism arguably reduces to generalizable 
weakness of will—that is, weakness of will plus the fact that 
most other people suffer from this condition, in which case it is 
the norm.  So if situationism were recognized as an excuse for 
criminal wrongdoing, then we would also have to recognize 
weakness of will as an excuse.  But this proposal is implausible 
for several reasons.  The first reason is that it would undermine 
the criminal justice system; too many defendants could simply 
argue that they were too weak to avoid breaking the law.  If this 
excuse works for Volunteer, then there is no reason that it 
should not work for most or all other defendants who invoke it. 
The second reason that weakness of will and therefore 
situationism should not be recognized as an excuse in the 
criminal law is that formally recognizing this excuse would 
disincentivize many individuals tempted to break the law from 
exerting greater effort to resist this temptation.  Once would-be 
law-breakers realized that the weakness-of-will excuse would be 
available to them, the last remaining psychological obstacle to 
their refraining from criminal activity would be removed. 
The third reason that weakness of will should not be 
recognized as an excuse in the criminal law is that it does not 
amount to a negation of condition (6)—again, a threshold 
capacity to refrain from violating C.  In the previous section, I 
implied the opposite.  I said, “[T]o say that [Volunteer] was too 
weak is just to say that, given her constitution, she could not 
have mustered the strength and courage to resist Instructor’s 
commands—no more than most of us can sit still at a green light 
and withstand the pressure of angry drivers honking their horns 
behind us.”  But there is another approach to weakness of will, 
an approach that does not equate it with an inability to do 
otherwise.  On this approach, weakness of will is not a 
constitutive condition that destines the individual to failure.  On 
the contrary, it is a temporary condition that the individual freely 
chose—and therefore might or would have avoided by exerting 
greater effort to make the opposite choice.  Indeed, weakness of 
will is often contrasted with addiction, which is thought to be a 
sort of internal compulsion that leaves the addict with little to no 
choice.122 
 
122.  See supra note 57 and accompanying text. 
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One might argue that my point here contradicts what I 
argued in Part V.E.  Again, I have just suggested that a person 
who commits a crime from weakness of will is criminally 
responsible for this act because she could have avoided it—i.e., 
could have tried harder not to give in.  In Part V.E, however, I 
suggested that Volunteer was too weak to refrain from killing 
Fellow and therefore was not morally responsible for his death.  
How can both of these points be true?  The answer is that there 
are two different kinds of ability to do otherwise.  On the one 
hand, the kind of ability to do otherwise that is necessary for 
criminal responsibility—and which Volunteer arguably had—is 
“compatibilist” (i.e., compatible with determinism).  On the 
other hand, the kind of ability to do otherwise that is necessary 
for moral responsibility but not for criminal responsibility—and 
which Volunteer arguably lacked—is “incompatibilist” (i.e., 
incompatible with determinism). 
I will start with the latter point first.  When we are judging 
the individual morally, we often interpret the power to do 
otherwise in the incompatibilist sense.  According to 
incompatibilism, the ability to do otherwise requires 
indeterminism.123  To say that the individual could have done 
otherwise is just to say that she might have performed another 
action with the very same history—that is, under the very same 
internal (psychological) and external (environmental) 
circumstances.  On this view, Volunteer could not have done 
otherwise.  The overwhelming weight of internal and external 
circumstances left her no choice but to keep shocking Fellow 
until he died. 
When we are judging criminal defendants, however, we 
tend to interpret the power to do otherwise in a compatibilist 
sense.  According to compatibilism, the ability to do otherwise is 
perfectly consistent with determinism.  To say that an individual 
could have done otherwise is to say not that she might have done 
otherwise under the very same circumstances but rather that she 
would have done otherwise had she wanted or tried.124  On this 
 
123.  See VAN INWAGEN, supra note 27, at 126-27.  There are two versions of 
incompatibilism.  One version says that indeterminism is necessary for the ability to do 
otherwise.  The other version of incompatibilism says that indeterminism is necessary for 
responsibility.  Most incompatibilists subscribe to both versions.   
124.  See supra note 32 and accompanying text.  Just as there are two versions of 
incompatibilism, there are two versions of compatibilism.  According to the first version, 
determinism is compatible with the ability to do otherwise.  According to the second 
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view, Volunteer could have done otherwise.  If she had decided 
to stop shocking Fellow, her decision would have been effective; 
she would indeed have stopped shocking Fellow. 
Criminal courts tend not to employ the incompatibilist 
sense of the ability to do otherwise because (a) the criminal 
justice system is supposed to make all of its critical judgments 
on the basis of provable evidence; and (b) determining whether a 
defendant might have indeterministically refrained from 
committing a crime requires unverifiable speculation.125  It is 
unverifiable for two reasons.  First, counterfactuals such as “he 
might have done otherwise under the very same circumstances” 
reference possible worlds that are not actual.  And because we 
are always confined to the actual world and cannot “peer” into 
non-actual possible worlds, attorneys simply cannot prove to 
judges or juries this kind of counterfactual.126  Second, we 
 
version, determinism is compatible with responsibility.  “Semi-compatibilists” subscribe to 
the second version over the first; they believe that even if indeterminism is necessary for 
the ability to do otherwise, neither indeterminism nor the ability to do otherwise is 
necessary for responsibility.  See, e.g., John Martin Fischer, The Importance of Frankfurt-
Style Argument, 57 PHIL. Q. 464 (2007).  
125.  See Margaret M. deGuzman, Choosing to Prosecute: Expressive Selection at 
the International Criminal Court, 33 MICH. J. INT’L L. 265, 308 (2012) (“The debate about 
whether the [International Criminal Court] is capable of deterring potential criminals may 
be impossible to resolve in light of the problem of counterfactual proof.”); Arthur Durst, 
Property and Mortgage Fraud Under the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act: What Is 
Stolen and When Is It Returned?, 5 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 279, 301 (2014) (“Courts 
have been reluctant to wade into speculative waters.”); Kadish, supra note 74, at 281 (“It 
has been urged with force that there is no way objectively to establish that a person could 
not refrain from a criminal action, rather than would not, and that therefore such a test 
‘involves an unacceptable risk of abuse and mistake.’”) (footnote omitted); Rainer Knopff, 
The Politics of Reforming Judicial Appointments, 58 U.N.B. L.J. 44, 51 (2008) (“One 
cannot prove counterfactuals, of course . . . .”); Vanessa Laird, Note, Phantom Selves: The 
Search for a General Charitable Intent in the Application of the Cy Pres Doctrine, 40 
STAN. L. REV. 973, 978 (1988) (“It is extremely difficult to give anything other than a 
vague account of the conditions in which a counterfactual will be true. . . .  It is . . . 
impossible to differentiate between alternative counterfactuals on the basis of the truth or 
falsity of their components.”) (footnotes omitted); L. Scott Smith, Law, Morality, and 
Judicial Decision-Making, 65 TEX. B.J. 400, 403 (2002) (“The problem is that the 
counterfactual question is often, in principle, unanswerable, and may result in an answer 
that is little more than conjectural.  Attempting to answer a counterfactual question may 
prove more difficult than looking for the proverbial needle in a haystack, for the search is 
for what usually does not exist.”); David A. Westbrook, Visions of History in the Hope for 
Sustainable Development, 10 BUFF. ENVTL. L.J. 301, 314 (2003) (“[I]t is generally 
impossible to prove counterfactuals in history . . . .”). 
126.  See Michael A. Carrier, A Tort-Based Causation Framework for Antitrust 
Analysis, 77 ANTITRUST L.J. 991, 1015 (2011) (“[B]ecause it is so difficult to prove the 
counterfactual of what would have happened absent the conduct, it will almost always be 
impossible to trace the link between conduct and outcome with certainty.”). 
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would need to know both what events took place in the 
defendant’s brain at the time of the crime and whether these 
events were determined to learn if the defendant could have 
refrained from committing the crime.  Given the present state of 
technology, both of these facts are unknowable; and given that 
the defendant’s criminal act took place in the past, outside the 
scope of a brain scan, this knowledge will probably elude even 
further advances in technology. 
Again, for both these reasons, most courts, scholars, and 
attorneys implicitly or explicitly apply the compatibilist 
interpretation of the ability to do otherwise, which focuses not 
on unprovable counterfactuals but rather on the factual 
circumstances surrounding the actual exercise or non-exercise of 
this ability.  They ask not whether the defendant might have 
done otherwise under the same exact circumstances but whether 
the defendant was forced or compelled to act the way that she 
did.  If she was not, then she could have done otherwise in the 
sense that she would have done otherwise if she had wanted or 
tried.  Nothing would have prevented her from refraining from 
committing the crime had she inclined in this direction.127  This 
version of the ability to do otherwise does not require 
speculation because it reduces to a factual question—was there 
force or any extant obstacles to the opposite course of action?—
rather than to a genuinely counterfactual question. 
On the compatibilist approach, which (again) the courts 
tend to employ, situationism does not qualify as an excuse.  The 
mere fact that the majority of people are often too weak to do 
the right thing in the face of social pressure to do evil hardly 
means that they were compelled to act as they did, that they 
would not have done the right thing had they tried a little harder.  
As a result, contrary to the excuses, we can reasonably expect 
them to have done the right thing.  Indeed, a significant enough 
minority of people in the same situation do resist the temptation 
or pressure.  Again, 35% of the volunteers in the Milgram 
experiment did disobey Instructor, despite their feeling 
tremendous pressure to obey.  And this fact implies that most or 
even all of the other 65% could have disobeyed (i.e., would have 
disobeyed had they tried harder) and therefore that we can 
 
127.  See DENNETT, ELBOW ROOM, supra note 27, at 139 (“[W]hat would an open 
future be?  A future in which our deliberation is effective:  a future in which if I decide to 
do A then I will do A, and if I decide to do B then I will do B . . . .”). 
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reasonably expect most or even all of the other 65% to have 
disobeyed. 
While my argument in this section has been that 
situationism does not qualify as a criminal excuse, it can also be 
used to weigh against recognizing situationism as a moral 
excuse.  As we saw in Part II, philosophers wildly disagree 
about whether genuine moral responsibility is even possible.  
Some philosophers react to this disagreement by descending 
from the confusion, returning to first principles, establishing 
what seems from ordinary common sense to be a paradigmatic 
example of moral responsibility, and then using this example as 
a test case for the skeptical arguments.  The paradigmatic 
example of moral responsibility is a rational, sane person who 
knowingly and willingly commits wrongdoing without being 
forced or coerced.  Well, this description seems to apply quite 
accurately to “victims” of situationism.  Again, in the Milgram 
experiment, 65% of the subjects knowingly and willingly 
shocked a person, despite his strenuous protests, to a point 
where he stopped protesting altogether in a manner indicating 
coma or death.  Yes, they were arguably pressured.  But, as I 
have been arguing, this pressure was simply not strong enough 
to warrant the conclusion that they were forced or coerced.  So, 
far from situationism’s being a good moral excuse, it seems to 
represent the very opposite—the paradigmatic example of moral 
responsibility.  Quite arguably, if a person is not morally 
responsible in a situationist situation, she is never morally 
responsible. 
VII.  THE INSANITY DEFENSE: TWO FINAL 
OBJECTIONS 
In this Part, I will anticipate and address two final 
objections against my conclusions in Part VI.  Both objections 
concern the insanity defense.  The first objection is that victims 
of situationism are not criminally responsible because their 
reason or judgment is so clouded by surrounding circumstances 
and norms that they cannot be said to know (or “substantially 
appreciate”) right from wrong and therefore cannot be 
reasonably expected to have done otherwise.  While this is a 
profound objection, I do not believe that it is insurmountable.  
Given the distinction between mad and bad, between 
psychologically disturbed and immoral, situationism inclines 
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more toward the bad/immoral side than the mad/disturbed side.  
The 65% who obeyed the research instructor to the bitter end in 
Milgram’s shock experiments were not suffering from 
permanent insanity, and it seems highly counterintuitive to 
suggest that they were suffering from temporary insanity.  If 
giving into pressure from authority were an indication of 
temporary insanity, then we would have to regard most students, 
employees, and soldiers as temporarily insane many times on a 
daily basis.  And this point is absurd. 
The second objection concerns my central thesis that 
criminal responsibility does not require moral responsibility.  
The common, if not universal, wisdom is that if a person is not 
morally responsible for a given act, then it is simply unjust to 
hold her criminally responsible.128  Indeed, this is arguably the 
reason why forty-six states, the federal government, and the 
military recognize the insanity defense.129  The logic behind the 
insanity defense is that if an adult is not morally responsible for 
her behavior because of insanity—a mental defect or disorder 
that negates her moral understanding and, in some cases, 
control—then it would be unjust, not to mention pointless, to 
hold her criminally responsible, and therefore punishable, for 
her criminal behavior.130 
Still, there are two problems with this interpretation of the 
insanity defense.  First, one might argue that there is a very 
different logic behind the insanity defense and therefore that 
there is a very different reason why forty-six states (and the 
federal government and military) do still recognize it.  They 
recognize it not because insanity negates moral responsibility 
but because insanity negates criminal responsibility, which is 
different—as I argued in Part III.131 
Second, the remaining states that recognize the insanity 
defense on the assumptions that (a) insanity negates moral 
responsibility and (b) criminal responsibility requires moral 
responsibility are simply misguided.  (a) is true, but (b) is false.  
 
128.  See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
129.  See Levy, supra note 5, at 1345-50. 
130.  See id. at 1345. 
131.  Four states—Idaho, Kansas, Montana, and Utah—do not even recognize the 
insanity defense.  See IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-207 (2015); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5209 
(West 2015); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 46-14-102, -103, -311 (West 2015); UTAH CODE ANN. 
§ 76-2-305 (LexisNexis 2015).  So they at least seem willing to hold at least some people 
criminally responsible who are not morally responsible. 
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Criminal responsibility does not require moral responsibility.  
Once again, it requires only: 
(5) knowledge, or a threshold capacity to know, the 
(relevant) criminal law “C”; 
(6) a threshold capacity to refrain from violating C; 
(7) threshold control over violating C; and 
(8) an absence of circumstances that excuse this violation. 
VIII.  CONCLUSION 
Most people—including judges, attorneys, and scholars—
simply assume that criminal responsibility requires moral 
responsibility.  They believe that it is just plain wrong—morally 
and legally wrong—to convict and punish individuals who are 
not morally responsible for their criminal acts.  I hope to have 
shown in this article, however, that this nearly universal belief is 
false; that when judges and juries attempt to assess criminal 
guilt, they should not really care whether the defendant was 
morally responsible for her act.132 
This point is not as counterintuitive as it might initially 
seem.  There turns out to be a significant gap between morality 
and criminal law.  We criminalize some perfectly amoral acts 
(most malum prohibitum crimes—for example, public 
intoxication and drug possession) and do not criminalize all 
immoral acts—for example, lying to one’s parents and breaking 
promises to friends.  All of this is as it should be.  If we 
attempted to criminalize all things immoral, our society would 
turn into a very unpleasant, highly restricted police state.  And if 
we attempted to criminalize only things immoral, we would 
have to discard many perfectly legitimate criminal laws (again, 
all malum prohibitum crimes). 
Likewise, then, with moral and criminal responsibility.  
The latter does not perfectly track the former.  Nor should it.  If 
 
132.  I have offered two arguments in this article that criminal responsibility does not 
require moral responsibility.  In Part II, I argued that even if responsibility were 
metaphysically impossible, it would still be just to hold criminals responsible for their 
criminal acts.  The reason is that all of the skeptical arguments against responsibility are 
really directed against moral responsibility, not against criminal responsibility.  And in 
Parts V and VI, I argued for two propositions:  (a) situationism negates moral responsibility 
and (b) situationism should not be recognized as a criminal excuse.  If (a) and (b) are 
correct, then a victim of situationism might be criminally responsible, even though she is 
not morally responsible, for her criminal acts. 
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it did—that is, if we required individuals to be morally 
responsible in order to be held criminally responsible—then we 
would find ourselves in a very difficult bind.  As I argued in Part 
III, moral responsibility requires four conditions to be satisfied: 
(1) knowledge, or a threshold capacity to know, that a 
given action “A” is morally wrong; 
(2) a threshold capacity to refrain from A-ing; 
(3) control over A-ing; and 
(4) an absence of circumstances that excuse this 
performance. 
But when it comes to criminal responsibility, condition (1) 
is irrelevant,133 and condition (2) is impossible to determine on 
the basis of provable evidence.134  So if proof of moral 
responsibility were required to establish criminal responsibility 
and thereby obtain criminal convictions, the criminal courts 
would either have to acquit most defendants or just pretend that 
they had conducted applicable moral-responsibility evaluations.  
Because neither result is desirable, it is much better that we 
continue to keep considerations of moral responsibility out of 




133.  Only knowledge of the criminal law, not morality, is necessary.  See Levy, 
supra note 5, at 1367-70 (arguing that when it comes to determining whether a given 
defendant is guilty or not guilty, it matters only whether the defendant knew or had a 
threshold capacity to know the criminal law, not whether she knew or had a threshold 
capacity to know the moral law). 
134.  See supra notes 125 and 126 and accompanying text. 
135.  See supra note 51 and accompanying text. 
